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Abstract
Insurance companies are in the business of discrimination. Insurers attempt to segregate insureds
into separate risk pools based on their differences in risk profiles, first, so that they can charge
different premiums to the different groups based on their risk and, second, to incentivize risk
reduction by insureds. This is why we let insurers discriminate. There are, however, limits to
the types of discrimination we will allow insurers to engage in. But what exactly are those
limits and how are they justified? To answer these questions, this Article articulates the leading
fairness and efficiency arguments for and against limiting insurers’ ability to discriminate in their
underwriting; identifies on this basis a set of predictions as to what one would expect state antidiscrimination laws to look like; and evaluates some of those predictions against a unique handcollected dataset consisting of the laws regulating insurer risk classification in all 51 U.S.
jurisdictions. Among our findings is that contrary to the conventional wisdom state insurance
anti-discrimination laws vary a great deal, in substance and in the intensity of regulation, across
lines of insurance, across policyholder characteristics, and across states. The Article also finds
that, contrary to our predictions, a surprising number of jurisdictions do not have any laws
restricting insurers’ ability to discriminate on the basis of race, national origin, or religion. It
concludes by discussing whether this fact indicates that states have inadequately policed unfair
discrimination in insurance or impacts the larger policy decision in this country to leave
insurance anti-discrimination law to the states.

* We are grateful for comments from Kenneth Abraham, Tom Baker, Martin Grace, David Hyman, Stefanie
Lindquist, and Charlie Silver. Nathaniel Lipanovich and Rachel Ezzell provided excellent research assistance. We
are also thankful to the University of Michigan Law School Library staff and especially Faculty Services Reference
Librarian Seth Quidachay-Swan and his team of law students at the University of Michigan Law School, including
David Lund, Justin Bonfiglio, Stephanie Cunningham, and Chris Galeczka, for their heroic work in assembling the
dataset.
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INTRODUCTION
We discriminate when we draw distinctions between things. Individuals, corporations,
and governments draw distinctions all the time, and in ways that are widely considered
unobjectionable. However, the word "discrimination" has taken on a negative connotation,
because of the various types of discrimination "against" particular groups of people based on
particular characteristics, such as race or religion or gender. Such discrimination is often deemed
immoral or illegal or both. 1 Much has been written by legal scholars and philosophers on the
question of what distinguishes good discrimination from bad, 2 and there are whole fields of law,
such as employment discrimination law, that are devoted to the question of when discrimination
should be deemed illegal and when not. 3
Insurance companies are in the business of a particular type of discrimination, not among
their employees but among their insureds. That is how insurance works. Insurers attempt to
classify insureds into separate risk pools based on differences in their risk profiles. Thus, insurers
openly discriminate among individuals based on observable characteristics. Moreover, they do
this, among other reasons, so that they can charge different premiums to different groups of
insureds based on differences in their risks. Discrimination or risk classification 4 by insurers can
also create incentives for insureds to minimize risks: that is, if an insured will take care to reduce
her risk level, a discriminating insurer will lower her premium. In a sense, these two reasons
(accurate risk classification and incentivizing risk reduction) provide the primary justifications
1

See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and
Proxies, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 149, 151 (1992) (“We all know it is wrong to refuse to hire women as truck drivers, to
refuse to let blacks practice law, to bar Moslems from basketball teams, or to refuse to sit next to Rastafarians at
lunch counters. At the same time, we also know it is not wrong to refuse to hire the blind as truck drivers, to refuse
to admit those who flunk the bar exam to the practice of law, to bar short, slow, uncoordinated persons from the
basketball team, or to refuse to sit next to people who haven't bathed recently.”); . and DEBORAH HELLMAN, W HEN
IS D ISCRIMINATION W RONG? 1 (2008)(“And we know that while it is okay for a school principal to ask students
with last names beginning with A-M to sit on one side of the auditorium and students with last names beginning
with A-Z to sit on the other, it is not okay for a local law to require black bus passengers to sit in the back and whites
in the front.”).
2
See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 1 (addressing the question generally of how to distinguish morally acceptable
from morally unacceptable, and legal from illegal, discrimination); SANDRA FRIEDMAN, DISCRIMINATION LAW (2d
ed. 2011) (same); HELLMAN, supra note 1 (same); Deborah Hellman, When Is Discrimination Wrong?,
B ALKINIZATION (Jun. 20, 2008, 10:30 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/when-is-discriminationwrong.html (same); Richard Arneson, What is Wrongful Discrimination?, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 775 (2006) (same).
There is a large literature also on the specific question whether discrimination of particular types, such as racial
discrimination in the workplace, is efficient or not. See, e.g., GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION
(2d ed. 1971); John Donohue, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986); Richard A. Posner, The
Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 PA. L. REV. 513 (1987). Any list of classic articles on the topic of what
constitutes illegitimate discrimination should include Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976); and Charles R. Lawrence III, Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
3
See, e.g., John J. Donohue III, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An Economic Perspective, 56
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1337, 1365-66 (1989); Gillian K. Hadfield, Rational Women: A Test for Sex-Based Harassment, 83
Cal. L. Rev. 1151, 1175-76, 1180 (1995) .
4
We use the terms “discrimination” and “risk classification” synonymously throughout this article when
referring to insurers’ efforts to sort insureds into different groups based on differences in risks.
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for why we let insurers discriminate. Insurers provide a valuable social function—in risk
shifting, risk spreading and risk reduction—at least in part because they are allowed to, are
expected to, and do discriminate.
There are, however, limits on the discrimination that insurers are permitted to engage in.
Some of these limits stem from federal laws. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010 [“PPACA”], together with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
[“HIPAA”], forbids insurers from considering pre-existing conditions in the underwriting
process. 5 PPACA also forbids health insurers from taking gender into account. 6 Likewise, the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 [“GINA”] prohibits all health insurers from
denying coverage or charging different premiums to insureds based on genetic information. 7
Finally, a recent rule issued by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
provides that the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) applies to insurance and prohibits housing practices
that have an unjustified disparate impact on protected classes. 8 Besides those four recent
statutes, however, there are no federal laws expressly forbidding insurers from engaging in any
form of discrimination in the underwriting process. There is therefore no federal law specifically
forbidding insurance companies from taking into account, for example, race, religion, national
origin, or gender, at least outside the context of homeowners insurance.
What all of this means is that discrimination by insurers in the underwriting process is
largely unregulated at the federal level, leaving the states as the regulators of insurer
discrimination. How this came to be has much to do with the history of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act [“MFA”], which effectively delegated to the states the primary responsibility for regulating
insurance in this country. 9 Whether such an allocation of regulatory authority with respect to
insurance discrimination has turned out well is an interesting and largely unstudied question, a
question that this Article begins to answer.
More specifically, the Article addresses three general questions. First, as the country’s
primary promulgators of insurance anti-discrimination law, what factors should state
5

The other two are HIPAA and PPACA. HIPAA prohibits groups health insurers from excluding an insured’s
pre-existing condition from coverage for more than 12 months after the insured’s enrollment date, and the 12 month
period was shortened or eliminated for people who were previously insured. HIPAA also prohibited group health
insurers from excluding individuals on the basis of genetic predisposition to certain diseases. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)
(2006). PPACA prohibits all health insurers from denying coverage on the basis of pre-existing conditions, and for
health status generally, for children starting in 2010 for adults starting in 2014. ACA § 1201, 124 Stat. at 154–55
(adding § 2704 to the PHSA) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3) (preexisting conditions); ACA § 1201, 124
Stat. at 156–60 (adding § 2705 to the PHSA) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4) (prohibiting discrimination).
6
ACA § 1201, 124 Stat. at 156–60 (adding § 2705 to the PHSA) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4).
7
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Act, Pub. L. No. 110-223, 122 Stat. 881, 883, 888
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(b)) (adding § 1182(b) to ERISA and adding §
300gg-1(b) to the PHSA)
8
See HUD Rule Imposes Disparate Impact Standard on Insurance, Insurance Compliance Insight.
9
Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, federal laws that affect insurance are deemed “reverse preempted” by any
conflicting state law, unless the federal law expressly provides that it is meant to apply to insurance. 15 U.S.C. §
1012(b) (2006).
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governments take into account when deciding whether and to what extent to limit insurers’
ability to discriminate? In answering this normative question, Part I provides the first systematic
integration of the risk-classification scholarship that has been published in insurance economics
journals with the risk-classification scholarship of legal academics. It distills from these
literatures twelve different factors that may shape the normative case for laws restricting
insurers’ capacity to discriminate among different policyholders.
Second, taking into account the various normative considerations identified in Part I, Part
II attempts to identify or predict what actual anti-discrimination laws state legislatures should be
expected to enact. These predictions will depend not only on what laws reflect the best balance
of normative concerns but also on various political considerations, such as which laws most help
insurers to maximize their profits (since insurers as a group will sometimes be a relatively
powerful lobbying force) and which laws are consistent and which in conflict with widely shared
social norms (since legislatures can also on occasion be responsive to the masses). Part II,
therefore, takes into account political economy concerns as well the normative considerations
outlined in Part I.
Third, building on Parts I and II, Part III asks the surprisingly difficult and previously
unexamined question: what laws dealing with risk classification have states actually adopted?
The reason this question is both difficult to answer and has been largely ignored is that the
exercise of merely identifying the laws in all the relevant jurisdictions requires hours of
painstaking research and analysis. And that is what we, together with a team of research
assistants, have done. We have developed a unique, hand-collected dataset of state statutes
governing insurer risk classification. This task required us to identify and analyze the insurance
statutes, and any related regulatory or judicial interpretations of those statutes, in all 50 states
(and Washington DC) and then to code those laws and sometimes their judicial or administrative
interpretations for five different lines of insurance—health, life, disability, auto, and
property/casualty—and for nine different characteristics—race, national origin, religion, gender,
age, credit score, genetics, sexual orientation, and zip code. The result is the first ever
comprehensive database of insurance anti-discrimination laws in the U.S. dealing with those nine
characteristics.
Part III summarizes some of the key results of our research and compares them with the
predictions we developed in Part II. 10 For example, Part II predicts that all jurisdictions would
either forbid or strongly limit insurers’ ability to discriminate among insureds on the basis of
race, national origin, or religion. Indeed, based on our experience in the insurance law field over
many years, it seems that the conventional wisdom among many if not most insurance law
scholars, teachers, and students is that every state in the country forbids the use of such

10

In the interest of keeping this Article a manageable length, some of the empirical results will be explored in a
subsequent paper.
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characteristics, especially race, in insurance underwriting. 11 Surprisingly, this prediction is
incorrect: more than half the states do not ban the use of race in life, health, and disability
insurance, 23 states do not ban its use in auto insurance, and 18 do not ban its use for
property/casualty insurance. Similar statements can be made about national origin and religion.
We also find similar gaps in state laws for other policyholder characteristics: 37 states do not ban
the use of sexual orientation in health insurance and 40 states do not ban the use of gender in
auto insurance. As all this suggests, affirmative bans of insurer discrimination on the basis of
potentially suspect policyholder traits are quite rare. Thus, only 9 states ban the use of age in
auto insurance; only 5 states ban the use of genetic testing in disability insurance; and only 2
states ban the use of zip code in property/casualty insurance.
We conclude by offering a number of tentative theories that might explain these results.
We also consider their normative implications. For instance, might the lack of uniformity in
state insurance anti-discrimination regulation require a rethinking of this country’s longstanding
practice of generally leaving insurance issues to the states? To what extent does the fact that a
substantial number of states have failed to even address core issues of unfair discrimination in
their insurance laws indicate a failure in state unfair discrimination regulation writ large? And
what should we make of the stark contrast between this reality, and recent federal efforts to
address facially neutral insurance classification schemes that have a disparate impact on the
capacity of protected groups to acquire housing? 12
I. The Normative Framework
A. Fairness v. Efficiency
Laws limiting risk classification in insurance implicate a tradeoff between “efficiency”
and “fairness” concerns. 13 The efficiency costs of these laws stem principally from the fact that
they attempt to force insurers to charge the same premiums to individuals who pose different
predicted risks. This can generate the twin insurance harms of moral hazard and adverse
selection.
First, regulatory restrictions on insurers’ risk classifications can produce moral hazard by
undermining feature rating and experience rating. 14 Feature rating refers to insurer efforts to link
11

See, e.g., Stephen Brobeck & J. Robert Hunter, Consumer Federation of America, Lower-Income
Households and the Auto Insurance Marketplace: Challenges and Opportunities, CONSUMERFED.ORG, Jan. 30,
2012, http://www.consumerfed.org/news/450 (“No states, for example, permit the use of race or income in ratemaking.”); Jill Gaulding, Race, Sex, and Genetic Discrimination in Insurance: What’s Fair?, 80 CORN. L. REV.
1646, 1646 (1994) (reporting that it would be illegal in every state for an insurer to charge more to African
Americans because they have shorter expected life spans).
12
See HUD Rule Imposes Disparate Impact Standard on Insurance, Insurance Compliance Insight.
13
See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 71 VA. L. REV. 403
(1985); Michael Hoy & Michael Ruse, Regulating Genetic Information in Insurance Markets, 8 RISK MGMT. & INS.
REV. 211 (2005) (“Economists can contribute to the debate [about regulating genetic information in insurance
markets] by casting the problem as a classic efficiency-equity trade-off.”).
14
KENNETH ABRAHAM , D ISTRIBUTING R ISK 71-72 (1986).
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premiums to policyholder characteristics that correlate with risk. Experience rating, by contrast,
refers to the linking of premiums with policyholders’ actual loss experiences. Both mechanisms
attempt to improve the accuracy of the premium calculation and to incentivize policyholder care
(notwithstanding insurance coverage) by increasing the likelihood that a failure to take care will
result in a future increase in premiums. These tools are undermined when risk classification
restrictions limit the capacity of insurers to adjust their premiums. 15
Second, regulatory restrictions on insurers’ risk classifications can generate adverse
selection. Adverse selection can occur when policyholders have private information about their
own riskiness that insurers do not observe. If policyholders know they cannot be charged more
for insurance coverage even if their riskiness is higher than average, they may be more likely to
buy insurance coverage because they will not pay its full price. 16 If this occurs, then insurers
may respond by charging low-risk individuals premiums that are too high for their risk.
Anticipating this sort of inaccuracy in pricing, low-risk individuals may exit the risk pool and opt
not to purchase insurance coverage at all. To prevent this exit of low-risk policyholders, insurers
can design policy coverage specifically to appeal to low-risks by offering incomplete coverage in
return for a low premium. 17
By contrast, defenders of laws limiting insurers’ ability to classify risks typically rely on
“fairness” based arguments. Frequently these arguments embrace a vision of insurance as
solidarity – spreading risk within communities strengthens the fabric that connects individuals by
having them cross-subsidize each other’s risk. Risk classification undermines this vision, they
claim, by splitting communities into ever smaller and more fragmented risk pools, particularly
when it trades on preexisting social inequities and stereotypes. 18 Even when actuarial
correlations between characteristics and risk can be demonstrated, defenders of risk
classification regulation emphasize that this correlation is socially constructed, reflecting existing
norms, assumptions, and biases that frame both the collection and analysis of the data that
produces risk assessments. 19 By classifying risks, insurers consequently assign responsibility to
individuals in a manner that is much less stable and objective than actuarial science suggests. 20
15

See discussion infra Part I.B.4
To be sure, insurers will classify risks even without the threat of adverse selection, because competition from
other carriers will otherwise skim away the good risks. This does not represent a social cost, however, unless it
causes at least some policyholders to purchase less insurance than they would like to purchase at actuarially fair
rates.
17
Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1608-15 (2011); see also Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in
Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629, 634-38
(1976) (describing a theoretical model in which the design of the insurance market itself encourages individuals to
self-sort into risk categories).
18
Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in Health Reform, 14 CONN. I NS. L.J. 199
(2008); Deborah Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH P OL. P OL’Y & L. 287 (1993).
19
François Ewald, Insurance and Risk, in T HE FOUCAULT E FFECT: S TUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 197, 20610 (Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, & Peter Miller, eds., 1991); Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification
Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 534-36 (1983) (“However much the [insurance] companies plead
16
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While “fairness” is generally associated with opposition to risk classification, and
“efficiency” is associated with defenses of the practice, neither side has a monopoly on fairnessor efficiency-based arguments, as described more fully below. Despite this complication, it is
helpful to summarize the extant normative literature on risk-classification and insurance
discrimination through the “efficiency vs. fairness” lens. Interestingly, each of these
considerations is principally developed in a different academic literature. The efficiency
implications of risk classifications restrictions are explored principally in the risk management
and economics literature, whereas the fairness arguments concerning legal restrictions on risk
classification are explored principally in the legal literature. The historical disconnect between
these literatures 21 means that their collective insights have not previously been integrated or even
gathered together in a single place. 22 The next two sections attempt this task.
B. Efficiency-Based Considerations
1. Adverse Selection
As noted above, the risk of adverse selection is one potential efficiency cost of legal
restrictions on insurers’ risk-classification practices. 23 Indeed, the risk of adverse selection is so
often associated with regulatory restrictions on risk classification that some refer to the
phenomenon as “regulatory adverse selection.” The social cost of adverse selection is that some
risk-averse individuals forego coverage that they would like to purchase at actuarially fair
rates. 24 To the extent that adverse selection triggers undermines an insurance market entirely (a
so-called “death spiral”) or leads to strategic insurer efforts to segregate low-risk and high-risk
happenstance, insurance ‘risk’ classifications correlate with a fairly simplistic and static notion of social
stratification that is familiar to everyone.”).
20
TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY (2007).
21
See LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE (Daniel Schwarcz, ed., 2012).
22
The paper that comes closest to collecting all of these considerations is Seth J. Chandler, Visualizing Adverse
Selection: An Economic Approach to the Law of Insurance Underwriting, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 435 (2002). Much of
Chandler’s paper, though, builds off of his own computer model, and it therefore misses some of the points that have
been raised in other papers.
23
Indeed, one of the primary writers on the topic refers to such rules as “regulatory adverse selection.” See
Hoy, supra 15, at 245. The disadvantage of adverse selection can also be framed in fairness, rather than efficiency,
terms. Indeed, some promote the notion of actuarial fairness, which suggests that insurers have a moral
“responsibility to treat all [their] policyholders fairly by establishing premiums at a level consistent with the risk
represented by each policyholder.” See, e.g., Karen A. Clifford & Russel P. Inculano, Aids and Insurance: The
Rationale for Aids-Related Testing, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1806 (1987) (arguing that failing to screen insureds for
AIDS would be unfair “because it results in the subsidization of high risk individuals by those at low risk”). Various
industry-sponsored advertisements in the late 1980’s trumpeted a similar idea: that it is “unfair to pay for someone
else’s risks.” See Stone, supra note 17.
24
Jan Mossin, Aspects of Rational Insurance Purchasing, 76 J. POL. ECON. 553 (1968). These efficiency costs
are particularly large in the rare situations where adverse selection produces a “death spiral.” A death spiral occurs
when adverse selection becomes increasingly self-reinforcing; the lowest-risk policyholders opt out of the insurance
pool, driving up premiums and causing the next lowest-risk policyholders to opt out, and so on. Eventually, only
high-risk policyholders remain. Death spirals obviously generate substantial efficiency costs, as all but very highrisk individuals forego complete coverage. See Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An
Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1224 (2004).
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policyholders indirectly by offering multiple coverage options (a separating equilibrium), it can
also undermine regulatory objectives to promote subsidization from low-risk to high-risk
individuals. 25
Substantial empirical research has recently demonstrated that the threat of adverse
selection is much more contingent on the characteristics of particular insurance markets than has
traditionally been assumed. 26 Some insurance markets are quite susceptible to adverse selection,
while others are resistant to adverse selection. 27. Relevant factors for determining whether a
particular insurance market is at risk of adverse selection include: (1) the absence of useful
private information, (2) the existence of private information for some but not all policyholders in
a market, (3) policyholders’ inability or failure to use the private information they have, (4) the
presence of superior information or predictive power on the part of the insurer, (5) propitious
selection resulting from interaction between risk and risk aversion or other policyholder
characteristics associated with an increased tendency to purchase insurance, and (6) institutional
arrangements. 28
Numerous additional factors are likely relevant to the more specific prospect that a
regulatory risk classification restriction would trigger adverse selection. This would certainly
include both the size and risk levels of the population with the “high risk” characteristic whose
use is prohibited, as both factors would mediate the ultimate impact on rates of a risk
classification restriction. 29 It would also include the elasticity of demand among the population
of “low-risk” policyholders, as regulatory risk classification restrictions would cause them to
face slightly higher prices for coverage. Elasticity of demand for insurance, in turn, would
depend on factors such as the practical and legal necessity for the relevant type of insurance as
well as the magnitude of potential policyholders’ risk aversion.
Various more line-specific factors could also contribute to the risk of regulatory adverse
selection. For instance, risk-classification restrictions are less likely to generate adverse
25

Even ostensibly efficiency-oriented evaluations of risk-classification restrictions may reflect unstated
normative commitments to individual responsibility. This may manifest itself in these evaluations ignoring
alternative mechanisms to manage adverse selection risks, such as the mandated purchase of insurance or the
provision of universal coverage. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and
Risk Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 379-83 (2003) (cataloguing policy mechanisms for reducing adverse
selection without resort to risk classification).
26
Siegelman, supra note 8 at 1224 (showing that such death spirals are quite rare and that, in many cases,
adverse selection is itself uncommon). In a recent update and extension of this article, Siegelman and Cohen find
more mixed evidence of adverse selection in insurance markets, concluding that the phenomenon varies
substantially across different lines of insurance and even within particular insurance lines. Alma Cohen & Peter
Siegelman, Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets, 77 J. RISK & INS. 39 (2010).
27
Chandler, supra note 21 (using computer modeling to show the extent to which adverse selection depends on
numerous factors in the underlying insurance market).
28
Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets, 77 J. Risk & Ins. 39 (2010).
29
See Hoy, supra note 15 at 249-69; see also Chandler, supra note 21, at 498 (making similar point by noting
that homogeneity of risks in the underlying pool decreases the prospect of adverse selection, whereas heterogeneity
increases this risk).
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selection when high-risk policyholders cannot over-insure, and thus multiply the “advantage” of
being high-risk in a setting where carriers are forbidden from taking this into account. 30 At least
in life insurance, such over-insurance is possible because individuals can own multiple different
policies, each of whose benefits are unaffected by the existence of other policies. 31 The prospect
of regulatory adverse selection might also be exacerbated by the existence of a secondary market
for insurance policies, which is also a feature of life insurance and annuity markets. 32 Secondary
markets increase the risk of adverse selection by allowing high-risk individuals to purchase a
policy with an immediate guaranteed profit. 33 They also allow high-risk individuals to benefit
personally from their life insurance products. Finally, line-specific product features, such as the
existence of an incontestability period after which insurers cannot deny coverage for
misrepresentations or fraud, could also increase the risk of regulatory adverse selection. 34
2. Moral Hazard
Legal restrictions on insurers’ ability to classify risks can result in moral hazard, causing
policyholders to take less than socially-optimal levels of care. For instance, some commentators
have argued that rules prohibiting insurers from classifying policyholders on the basis of their
health status may encourage individuals to eat less healthy foods or exercise less. 35 Others have
claimed that rules prohibiting underwriting on the basis of geographic area can result in the overdevelopment of homes in risk-prone regions, such as along the coast of a hurricane-prone state. 36
In order for moral hazard to potentially result from legal restrictions on risk classification,
two conditions must be met. First, the regulated characteristic must be at least partially within
policyholders’ control. A good example is a legal prohibition on insurers using health-related
information of individuals in underwriting, as individuals clearly have some control over their
likelihood of getting sick. By contrast, rules prohibiting classification on the basis of age or
30

Hoy & Ruse, supra note 12; Chapter 6.
In most insurance contexts, policies contain coordination of benefits or “other insurance” provisions, which
prevent a policyholder from recovering under multiple policies in a way that would improve the policyholder’s
financial condition as a result of the loss.
32
See generally [Find cites]
33
Risk classification rules that would prevent investors from asking about individuals’ genetic makeup, cannot
prevent such transactions because these rules cannot prevent high-risk policyholders from volunteering information
about their genetic predispositions to investors. While individuals have an incentive to hide their genetic defects
from insurers, they have the opposite incentive when selling policies to third-party investors: the sooner the
policyholder is to die, the more investors will be willing to pay for the policy.
34
An insurer that sells individually underwritten auto or non-auto liability and property policies can cancel
policies or decline to renew when the policy comes up for renewal. See ROBERT JERRY, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW.
35
R ICHARD EPSTEIN, MORTAL P ERIL 125-126 (1997) (“Cross-subsidies necessarily allow everyone to pass off
some pat of the costs of their own risky behavior onto other persons.”); Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann,
Diabetes Treatments and Moral Hazard, 50 J.L. & Econ. 519 (2007) (finding that mandates for medical treatment
for diabetes generate a moral hazard problem with diabetics exhibiting higher BMIs after the adoption of these
mandates).
36
HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER ET. AL., AT W AR WITH THE W EATHER: M ANAGING LARGE -SCALE R ISKS IN A
NEW ERA OF C ATASTROPHES (2009).
31
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gender cannot produce moral hazard for the simple reason that individuals cannot change their
age or gender in response to such rules. Second, there must be some “but for” causal link
between the regulated characteristic and risk. Prohibitions on medical underwriting again
provide a suitable example: an individual is more likely to incur substantial health expenses if he
or she has a history of health-related expenses, and less likely to incur future expenses if she has
no preexisting conditions or medical risks. By contrast, while individuals have some degree of
control over their credit score (thus satisfying the first condition), it is unclear whether credit
score enjoys a “but for” causal connection to risk of loss. Thus, while prohibitions on insurers’
use of credit scores in underwriting might conceivably cause people to safeguard their credit
scores less effectively, it is not clear that this would actually lead to greater losses.
When these two pre-requisites are met, legal restrictions on risk classification may
generate moral hazard because they effectively operate as state-provided insurance against
classification risk. 37 In other words, by limiting the capacity of insurers to classify risks in the
future, these rules undermine individuals’ incentives to take care by protecting them from the
risk that their present behavior will impair their capacity to purchase affordable insurance in the
future. Thus, prohibiting health insurers from charging more to smokers may increase the
incidence of smoking and health risk because individuals will not worry that their decision to
smoke will subject them to increased insurance premiums in the future. The magnitude of this
effect likely depends substantially on the extent to which individuals appreciate the potential
links between their behavior and future premiums. 38 Thus, individuals are unlikely to change
their smoking habits in response to legal restrictions on insurers’ underwriting if they are
unaware of the potential link, or lack thereof, between smoking and future premiums. 39
3. Socially Wasteful Expenditures
The efficiency of risk-classification regulations may also be impacted by the prospect that
insurers’ classification efforts are socially wasteful. One of the primary ways that insurers
compete in unregulated insurance markets is by attempting to classify risks more accurately in
order to skim good risks from other companies and dump bad risks on those companies. These
efforts may be socially beneficial to the extent that they increase the number of low-risk
individuals who choose to purchase full insurance. 40 At the same time, though, these efforts
produce no social benefit to the extent that they merely shift the composition of policyholders
among different carriers, at least in those cases where moral hazard is not a possible outgrowth
of risk classification. From a social welfare standpoint, the same individuals are insured and
only the distribution of the resulting social benefits is at stake in the particular matching of
37

See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996).
39
On the difficulties of empirically estimating moral hazard and adverse selection see Ronen Avraham, The
Economics of Insurance Law—A Primer, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. (forthcoming 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1822330.
40
Whether they are in fact socially beneficial requires weighing the social benefit of increased coverage for
low-risk individuals against the cost of less insurance coverage for high-risk individuals.
38
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insurers and policyholders. By contrast, these efforts do indeed produce a social cost in the form
of money spent on classifying policyholders, which may be passed on to policyholders through
increased premiums. 41
In these settings, risk-classification regulations can be justified as a means for preventing
socially wasteful investments. 42 The power of this rationale for regulation depends largely on
the extent to which risk classification is costly. Thus, it is likely to be a more powerful
consideration when classification requires medical tests, genetic tests, physical examinations of
individuals or property, or extensive analysis of loss data and mitigation measures. 43 Indeed, this
argument figured prominently in debates about health care reform’s prohibition on medical
underwriting precisely because of the cost of such underwriting. 44 Interestingly, this argument
may also be persuasive when a carrier is legally or contractually required to investigate
representations in insurance applications, as is the case with doctrines imposing a duty to
underwrite or establishing a period of incontestability.
4. Private Acquisition of Information
Another relevant consideration in evaluating the efficiency of laws restricting risk
classification by insurers is the extent to which insurers’ classification efforts impact individuals’
ex ante incentives to learn of their own risk characteristics. Individuals may be deterred from
learning about their own risk profiles when insurers can use that information in underwriting.
This is a particular problem when the relevant information is expensive for carriers to uncover on
41

Keith J. Crocker & Arthur Snow, The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance
Industry, 94 J. POL. ECON. 321, 338 (1986) (“[F]or intermediate levels of cost the market still categorizes even
though the winners from categorization could not compensate the losers.”). In this way, these private risk
classification efforts are analogous to individual investments in protecting property that merely shift crime to
neighbors rather than reducing aggregate crime levels; in both cases parties invest in protecting themselves only to
shift costs on to others
42
Of course, risk-classification regulation may not be the optimal way to respond to this problem. For instance,
one recent article argues that it is preferable for governments to adopt partial social insurance that induces firms to
invest in classification only to the extent that doing so is socially efficient. Casey Rothschild, The Efficiency of
Categorical Discrimination in Insurance Markets, 78 CONN. INS. L.J. 267 (2011). Of course, social insurance
schemes raise their own set of efficiency problems and are often, as a practical matter, not politically feasible.
43
See Crocker & Snow, supra note 41. Genetic rating has attracted a wildly disproportionate amount of
scholarly attention, even while far more commonplace forms of risk classification have slipped by without much
academic comment. See, e.g., John V. Jacobi, Genetic Discrimination in a Time of False Hopes, 30 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 363 (2003); Nancy Kass & Amy Medley, Genetic Screening and Disability Insurance: What Can We Learn
from the Health Insurance Experience?, 35 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 66 (2007); Robert Lowe, Genetic Testing and
Insurance: Apocalypse Now?, 40 DRAKE L. REV. 507 (1991) Robert F. Rich & Julian Ziegler, Genetic
Discrimination in Health Insurance – Comprehensive Legal Solutions for a (Not So) Special Problem?, 2 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 5 (2005); Mark A. Rothstein, Predictive Genetic Testing for Alzheimer’s Disease in Long-Term
Care Insurance, 35 GA. L. REV. 707 (2001); Richard H. Underwood & Ronald C. Cadle, Genetics, Genetic Testing,
and the Specter of Discrimination: A Discussion Using Hypothetical Cases, 85 KY. L. J. 665.
44
Paul
Krugman,
Health
Care
Realities,
NYT IMES.COM,
Jul.
30,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/opinion/31krugman.html (“And in their efforts to avoid “medical losses,” the
industry term for paying medical bills, insurers spend much of the money taken in through premiums not on medical
treatment, but on ‘underwriting’ — screening out people likely to make insurance claims.”).
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a case-by-case basis. Such insurers will only be able to classify individuals through underwriting
applications that ask applicants to represent their subjective knowledge of their risk levels,
backed by the threat of rescission in the event a misrepresentation is subsequently discovered. In
order to avoid this risk, individuals may simply refrain from learning about their risk status. This
argument has gained particular salience in the context of genetic risk classification, with many
commentators arguing that individuals are deterred from acquiring valuable information about
their genetic makeup because of the potential insurance consequences of doing so. 45 The social
costs associated with individuals not learning their own risk characteristics include denial of
access to preventive medical care and decreased financial and family planning for a shorter
expected life span. 46
5. Positive Externalities of Risky Behavior
In some cases, individuals become high risk as a result of behavior that is socially
productive in the aggregate. For instance, doctors in high-risk specialties such as obstetrics
provide necessary and socially valuable services, even though their decision to become a
specialist exposes them to substantial risk that may not be fully compensated for through higher
salaries. Similarly, individuals who decide to have children obviously generate substantial social
benefits that may not be fully captured by the personal benefits of raising children. But they also
expose themselves to large new risks. In both cases, one can argue that insurers should be
prohibited from charging individuals more for their socially beneficial choices because this will
drive the underlying activity below socially optimal levels. 47 On the other hand, it is not clear
that the most efficient way to subsidize high risk socially productive behavior is via the
insurance markets, and not, say, via the tax and transfer systems. 48
6. Efficient Redistribution
Efficiency-oriented legal scholarship typically assumes that income redistribution should
generally be ignored in analyzing optimal legal rules, because such redistribution is most
efficiently accomplished through the tax-and-transfer system. 49 However, laws restricting
insurers’ use of certain characteristics may provide a type of redistribution from the better off to
the less well off that is preferable to redistribution within a tax-and-transfer system. 50 This is
because such laws produce a transfer that naturally approximates the difference in well being
associated with the characteristic. That is, assuming the characteristic in fact correlates with
45

See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf & Jeffrey P. Kahn, Genetic Testing and the Future of Disability Insurance: Ethics,
Law & Policy, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 6, 15 (2007).
46
Ronen Avraham, supra note 39, at 22.
47
Daniel Wikler, Personal and Social Responsibility for Health, 16 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 47, 53 (2002); Mark
Geistfeld, AALS Annual Meeting Presentation.
48
Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56
T AX. L. REV. 157 (2003).
49
LOUIS K APLOW & S TEVEN S HAVELL, F AIRNESS VERSUS W ELFARE (2002).
50
See Logue & Avraham, supra note 48.
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differences in expected losses, forbidding the use of that characteristic results in a transfer to
each insured who has the trait in an amount equal to the average expected losses associated with
the trait. And this transfer is funded by slightly higher premiums charged to the insureds in the
pool who do not have the trait. Moreover, assuming the risk-classification restrictions target
only traits that are beyond the insured’s control (such as race or gender or genes), they have an
advantage over a redistributive income tax regime, which has the notorious effect of distorting
individuals’ work/leisure decisions. 51
7. Collective Action Problems
Rules limiting insurers’ ability to classify risks may theoretically encourage insurers to
develop more efficient risk-classification schemes if these schemes have public good attributes. 52
Risk-classification methods are at least partially non-rivalrous because multiple insurers can use
them simultaneously. 53 Similarly, certain risk-classification frameworks may be non-excludable
because carriers can mimic innovations developed by a competitor. 54 These characteristics
suggest that individual insurers may have insufficient incentives to develop new risk
classification technologies. Regulation that prohibited antiquated risk-classification schemes
might be able to overcome this problem by encouraging insurers to develop alternative, and more
accurate, approaches to risk classification. 55 Of course, a major weakness of this argument is
that it assumes that insurers would respond to risk classification restrictions by developing more
accurate classification schemes. Yet insurers may well opt for even less accurate proxies for risk
in the face of restrictions on their classification practices. Thus, auto insurers prohibited from
rating on the basis of age may instead rate based only on zip code, which can be a proxy for age.
8. Insurer Usage of Underlying Characteristic

51

The disadvantage of risk-classification restrictions as a form of redistribution is that, if the insurance pools are
relatively small, it might be considered unfair that the additional costs associated with the particular trait are being
subsidized by only a small portion of the population; whereas, a tax-and-transfer approach would spread these costs
over the entire tax base. Logue & Avraham, supra note 48.
52
See Abraham, supra note 13, at 423.
53
To be sure, the more rivals that use an improved risk-classification scheme, the less that each insurer can
thereby gain a competitive advantage by skimming good risks from competitors.
54
Even though insurers generally do not need to reveal the details of their risk-classification schemes under
most state laws, and states provide trade secret protection to disclosed classification schemes, certain pricing
strategies may be relatively easy for competitors to observe simply through market research.
55
One potential example of this is the use of age in auto insurance. Age is a cheap, albeit imprecise, predictor
of expected loss. Age may be predictive of expected loss because it proxies for characteristics such as (i) driving
experience, (ii) likelihood of drunk driving, and (iii) attentiveness. By prohibiting insurers from relying on age,
lawmakers may prod insurers to develop better ways of directly measuring these more casual contributors to risk.
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Laws forbidding the use of a characteristic in underwriting may be hard to justify if
insurers are not actually discriminating among policyholders on the basis of that characteristic. 56
To some extent, though, this depends on why insurers are not using the relevant characteristic.
First, if insurers do not use a rating characteristic because it has no apparent predictive
value, then the case for legally restricting the use of this characteristic is extremely weak.
Insurers are unlikely to ever use a characteristic with no predictive power in underwriting,
meaning that the only social benefit such a law might provide is to articulate a moral
commitment to a principle. But such a law could produce potentially meaningful social costs in
the form of the public cost of legislating and the private cost of policing compliance. 57
Second, the case for regulation may be slightly stronger when the reason that carriers do
not use a policyholder characteristic is because the cost of determining and verifying the
characteristic outweighs the benefits of a more refined classification scheme. 58 Here, a plausible
case can be made for laws restricting insurers’ usage of characteristics that are predictive of risk,
but nonetheless not used because of the cost to insurers of evaluating that characteristic: even
though insurers are not currently employing the troubling characteristic in their underwriting,
this may change as the composition of the population or cost of collecting accurate policyholder
information changes. Legal prohibitions on risk classification can therefore be justified as a
mechanism for preventing potentially problematic insurer behavior in the future.
Finally, the case for regulation is relatively strong if insurers are refraining from using
problematic policyholder characteristics because they fear the potential reputational or regulatory
consequences of doing so. 59 There is good evidence that this occurs. For instance, both auto and
life insurers often do not take into account policyholder occupation or geographic location, even
though both have been shown to predict claims and are relatively easy for insurers to
determine. 60 Similarly, long term care insurers do not generally take into account gender, even
though this has a substantial impact on claims experiences. 61 Evidence that smaller and newer
56

Evidence suggests that states often do pass coverage mandates that have no practical effect because all known
insurance plans are consistent with those mandates. See Amy Monahan, Fairness Versus Welfare in Health
Insurance Content Regulation, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 139 (2012).
57
Compliance costs may exist even if insurers are not using the underlying risk characteristic, because the
carrier must expend funds confirming that this is not the case.
58
See generally Amy Finkelstein & James Porterba, Testing for Adverse Selection with “Unused Observables”
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12112, 2006) (noting that insurers often do not use
policyholder characteristics in underwriting even though these characteristics have predictive value, and offering
various potential explanations for this phenomenon).
59
See Finkelstein & Porterba, supra note 58. Finkelstein and Porterba note a fourth potential explanation: that
the predictive content of characteristics such as place of residence may be limited by the extent to which such
characteristics are subject to change in response to characteristic-based pricing differentials. As they note, however,
this is unlikely to be a substantial factor in most cases because the difficulty of changing the underlying
characteristic will generally be larger than the potential insurance benefits of doing so.
60
See Finkelstein & Porterba, supra note 58, at 21.
61
See Jeffrey Browne & Amy Finkelstein, The Private Market for Long-Term Care Insurance In The United
States: A Review of the Evidence, 76 J. R ISK & INS. 5 (2009).
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firms have been more willing than established firms to introduce rating innovations suggests that
this behavior is partially explained by the fear of public or regulatory backlash; newer and
smaller firms are likely to be less deterred by the prospect of reputational or market backlash as a
result of risk classification innovation. 62 In these cases, laws explicitly limiting insurers’ ability
to employ the suspect characteristics have the benefit of reducing regulatory uncertainty. Of
course, a coherent argument can be made that regulation in these settings in neither necessary or
wise: when norms and reputation are sufficient to constrain private behavior, it may be best for
law to avoid intervention because of the risk that it may “crowd out” those norms. 63
C. Fairness-Related Considerations 64
1. Control and Social Solidarity
Perhaps the most frequently invoked argument in favor of risk-classification regulation is
that it is unfair to allow insurers to charge different rates based on characteristics that are beyond
individuals’ control. 65 This argument is typically grounded in a particular vision of insurance
that emphasizes its capacity to promote social solidarity, or just egalitarian redistribution, by
broadly distributing risks. From this perspective, many risks are the inevitable byproduct of the
environment we all operate within, such as the political regime (modern capitalism vs socialism),
technological and scientific advancements, and other features of the social landscape that are,
from the individual’s perspective, pure luck. The economic costs associated with these risks
should be distributed in a morally-blind manner. 66 Insurance is a social and economic tool for
counteracting this ethically unbound distribution of losses, allowing the collective to largely rid
itself of undeserved risk.
When insurers classify policyholders based on individual

62

See Finkelstein & Porterba, supra note 58.
See, e.g., Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2000); Larry E.
Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 568-71 (2001).
64
This Section draws heavily from Ken Abraham’s path-breaking article, Efficiency and Fairness in Risk
Classification. See Abraham, supra note 13.
65
See, e.g., Larry Gostin, Genetic Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic and Prognostic
Tests by Employers and Insurers, 17 AM J.L. & MED. 109, 112-13 (1991) (“Discrimination based on actual or
perceived genetic characteristics denies an individual equal opportunity because of a status over which she has no
control.”). Although typically framed in fairness language, this argument can be understood in economic terms to
preserve the ability of individuals to purchase insurance against these risks, which is welfare enhancing. From this
perspective, being born with unfavorable genes or permanent health problems is just like any other exogenous risk
against which people desire insurance. Prohibiting insurers from classifying on this basis merely allows people to
protect themselves against this risk even though they cannot purchase pre-birth insurance that specifically covers the
risk of being born with an unfavorable genetic hand. See, e.g., Michael Hoy, Risk Classification and Social Welfare,
31 GENEVA PAPERS 245, 262-63 (2006) For a discussion of the possibility in the future of genetic endowment
insurance, which would cover just this sort of risk, and the problems that such insurance might present, see Kyle
Logue & Joel Slemrod, Genes as Tags: The Tax Implications of Widely Available Genetic Information, 61 NAT.
T AX J. 843, 858-60 (2008) (discussing possibility of “genetic endowment insurance”).
66
EMBRACING R ISK: T HE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 33-51, (Tom Baker &
Jonathan Simon, eds., 2002); J ACOB S. HACKER, T HE GREAT R ISK SHIFT 42 (2006); Ewald, supra note 19, at 197210; Mariner, supra note 18; Stone, supra note 18.
63
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characteristics, they undermine this feature of insurance by “fragmenting communities into eversmaller, more homogenous groups.” 67
Although the strongest version of the social solidarity norm would prohibit all forms of
risk classification, many proponents of the social solidarity view will still permit classification
when policyholders have control over the relevant characteristic. In such cases, it is fair to
charge higher premiums because people choose to lead their life in a risky way. However,
defining what “control” means in this context is not always easy – or objective. Individuals are
generally deemed to have control over a relevant characteristic when they knowingly and
voluntarily make choices that determine their status as high-risk or low risk. For instance,
automobile insurers are generally (though not always) 68 allowed to charge more to individuals
who have been in an accident or received a speeding ticket: policyholders have a large degree of
control over these factors because they can choose to drive more slowly or safely. Similarly, but
on the other end of the spectrum, one reason commentators are often so opposed to geneticunderwriting is because people do not choose their genetic composition.
In many cases, though, it is hard to assess whether policyholders control their risk status.
For instance, while individuals clearly exert some level of control over their health status, this
control is obviously highly limited: fit people often get sick, and many obese individuals live
until old age. Of course, it is theoretically possible to hold people responsible only for health
features that involve choice, such as smoking, eating, and working out. But even in these
domains, it is difficult to determine what choice means. Much behavior that seems voluntary
may actually be the result of habit adopted in young age or addiction and, in any event, is highly
correlated with numerous social factors, such as growing up in poverty or in a particular cultural
setting. 69
2. Socially Suspect Classifications
A second fairness-based explanation for regulatory classification restrictions is that
insurers should be prohibited from making classifications that are socially suspect. The concept
of socially suspect classifications is difficult to define with perfect clarity. The term itself is a
product of U.S. constitutional law. According to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the equal
protection clause of the 14th Amendment, laws that discriminate on the basis of certain
characteristics are subject to a heightened degree of judicial review. Thus, while the vast
majority of laws that discriminate among different groups will be upheld as valid so long as
those laws have merely a “rational basis,” laws that discriminate on the basis of suspect
classifications will be struck down unless they meet a higher standard of judicial review.

Stone, supra note 18, at 290.
See Massachusetts law that requires insurers to give drivers one free accident. [Find cites]
69
See, e.g., Daniel Wikler, Personal and Social Responsibility for Health, 16 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 47, 53
(2002).
67
68
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According to the Court, suspect classifications can be identified by virtue of having three
factors in common: (1) there is a history of discrimination against the group in question; (2) the
characteristics that distinguish the group bear no relationship to the group members’ ability to
contribute to society; (3) the distinguishing characteristics are immutable; and (4) the subject
class lacks political power. 70 Applying these criteria, the Court has identified three
characteristics—race, religion, and national origin—that are considered suspect characteristics
and thus receive the highest level of scrutiny, known as strict scrutiny. 71 In addition, the Court
has also identified a class of “quasi-suspect” characteristics (to date limited to gender and
illegitimacy of birth) that receive an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny. 72 Given the criteria
cited above, these judicial categories appear to be meant to provide protection for groups who
not only have been habitually and unjustifiably discriminated against, but who also lack the
political power to do anything about it. 73
The Constitution and the courts are not the only sources of meaning for what constitutes a
socially suspect classification. More generally, we might regard as socially suspect any
classification that that reinforces or perpetuates broader social inequalities, or that causes some
sort of expressive harm by acknowledging and legitimating prior unfair treatment. 74 For
instance, society might object to an insurer who announced that it was willing to sell annuities at
better rates to African-Americans because they tend to have a shorter life span. This objection
might persist even though the traditionally disadvantaged group is made better off as a result of
the insurer classification scheme. 75
3. “Differential Inaccuracy” 76
A third fairness-based objection to risk classification arises out of the fact that all
classification regimes are imperfect. Not only are predictions about the future inherently
70

See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442, 445, 454.
The Caroline Products case famously established strict scrutiny and the concept of suspect classifications.
United States v. Caroline Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Subsequent cases identified race (Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)), national origin, (Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644–46 (1948)) and religion
(Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993)), as suspect classifications.
72
Intermediate scrutiny requires that the legal classification in question be “substantially related to an important
governmental objective.” Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). For cases establishing the categories of quasisuspect classifications, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (sex); and Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91,
98–99 (1982) (illegitimacy).
73
See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
74
Abraham frames this category more broadly in his article, stating that a classification can be suspect for at
least four reasons: (i) it is used improperly in other fields, (ii) it is not supported by sufficient data, (iii) it
systematically works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or (iv) it perpetuates unfair disadvantages outside of
the insurance system. In general, though, none of the first three explanations seem problematic unless they are
coupled with the fourth. It is not, for instance, troubling that classification schemes systematically work to the
disadvantage of individuals with bad driving records. Similarly, Abraham himself argues elsewhere in his article
that mere inaccuracy is not, in itself, a basis for a fairness objection. See Abraham, supra note 13.
75
Although often framed in terms of fairness, this argument can also be understood in economic terms as an
externality argument: insurers impose harms on society at large by relying on certain suspect classifications.
76
ABRAHAM , supra note 14 (coining this phrase).
71
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uncertain, but classification is itself costly. Efficient insurance regimes will only invest in
improving classification to the extent that the resulting benefits are larger than this cost. These
imperfections arguably do not inherently raise fairness concerns, as all policyholders are better
off when insurers choose not to invest beyond efficient levels in refining classification regimes. 77
However, inaccuracy in classification can raise fairness concerns when the burden of inaccuracy
is differentially allocated among policyholders, so that some groups bear a larger share of the
cost of such inaccuracy than other groups. 78 For instance, differential inaccuracy was a central
concern in the substantial literature on the use of HIV/AIDs status in insurance underwriting.
During the AIDS panic in the late 1980s, various life and health insurers began to include AIDSbased coverage exclusions in their policies. 79 Various commentators excoriated this practice,
arguing that the HIV antibody test was too unreliable to support such testing because it created
an unacceptably heterogeneous population of AIDS sufferers and false positives, forcing the
latter to bear the financial burden of the former. 80
4. Correlation and Causation
Insurance classification schemes are based on correlations between observed
policyholder characteristics and ultimate losses. 81 Of course, a correlation between two data
points does not necessarily imply a causal relationship. According to the American Academy of
Actuaries, insurer classification may “be more acceptable to the public if there is a demonstrable
cause and effect relationship between the risk characteristics and expected costs.” 82 Often,
though, objections to risk classification schemes that are articulated in terms of a lack of a causal
connection seem to in fact be driven by the perceived lack of a strong enough correlational
connection. For instance, detractors of gender-based insurance rating in life insurance often
contrast gender with age, arguing that “the association between age and mortality is much
stronger than that between sex and mortality.” 83 Similarly, at least some of the resistance to
race-based life insurance rating “undoubtedly comes from the perception that it makes little
factual sense, because… [t]he apparent differences are mostly environmental.” 84
See ABRAHAM , supra note 14; Abraham, supra note 13, at 429-31.
See ABRAHAM , supra note 14; Abraham, supra note 13, at 431-34.
79
Karen A. Clifford & Russel P. Inculano, Aids and Insurance: The Rationale for Aids-Related Testing, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1806 (1987). Even after the AIDS panic had subsided, some suspected that insurers were continuing
to discriminate against homosexuals as an at-risk group, by secretly targeting men in stereotypically gay
occupations. Katy Chi-Wen Li, The Private Insurance Industry’s Tactics Against Suspected Homosexuals:
Redlining Based on Occupation, Residence, and Marital Status, 22 AM.J.L. & MED. 477 (1996).
80
Judith A. Berman, Note, AIDS Antibody Testing and Health Insurance Underwriting: A Paradigmatic
Inquiry, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. 1059 (1989).
81
Professor Robert Rhee, Remarks at the Insurance Law Section of the AALS Annual Meeting (Jan. 7, 2012).
82
See American Academy of Actuaries.
83
Lea Brilmayer, Douglas Laycock & Teresa A. Sullivan, The Efficient Use of Group Averages as
Nondiscrimination: A Rejoinder to Professor Benston, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 250 (1983); see also Spencer L. Kimball,
Reverse Sex Discrimination: Manhart, 4 AM. BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 83, 108 (1979) (“Age discrimination
is so basic in life insurance and annuities that any serious challenge to it seems unlikely.”).
84
Kimball, supra note 64.
77
78
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What these quotations reveal is just how slippery the meaning of “causation” can be in
this context.85 Indeed, it is often not clear exactly what is meant by assertions that a relationship
between an underwriting factor and risk is causal. 86 Perhaps the clearest answer is that there is a
“but for” causal link, such that a change in the characteristic being underwritten would
necessarily produce a change in loss experiences, holding all else equal. Thus, the causal link
between credit scores and losses could be contested on the basis that credit scores decreased
significantly in the wake of the Great Recession, but loss experiences did not adjust
accordingly. 87 (Of course, if it is relative credit score—the score compared to others—that
matters to insurers, then a general drop in the average credit score is not relevant to insurers’ risk
analyses.)
But while “but for” causation may be necessary, it is likely not sufficient for a casual
relationship to exist, as any first-year tort student can explain. Just as in tort law, causation
inevitably also includes some notion of “proximate cause” to ensure that the relationship
between a but-for characteristic and loss is not excessively attenuated. None of this means that
the concept of causation cannot be operationalized in insurance: for instance, most would agree
that the link between smoking and life expectancy is causal. Rather, it means that this link
depends on factors such as the degree of correlation between policyholder characteristic and risk
of loss as well as the ease with which one can construct stories connecting policyholder
characteristics and risk.
To the extent that causal links between policyholder characteristics and risk can be
meaningfully identified, they tend to play one of two roles in fairness-based critiques of riskclassification schemes and their regulation. First, whenever the link between a particular
characteristic and risk is perceived to be non-casual, the use of the characteristic may be
challenged on the grounds of differential inaccuracy, as described above. In such cases, it can
always be argued that (i) the relevant characteristic is simply a proxy for some other causal
contributor to risk, and (ii) the burden of this inaccuracy is only borne by the portion of the risk
pool with the relevant characteristic. For instance, suppose that recent immigrants tend to get into
more car accidents, but that is entirely attributable to the fact that many recent immigrants were
trained to drive on the left side of the road. In these circumstances, charging recent immigrants
more might be contested due to the lack of causation between the characteristic and risk. In fact,
though, the fairness concern is better framed in terms of differential inaccuracy: the insurer
practice has the effect of forcing all recent immigrants, including those who learned to drive on
the right side of the road, to bear the burden associated with imperfect rating.

85

Regina Austin, supra note 19, at 559-63 (“Causation cannot serve as a neutral basis . . . . Causal attribution is
merely a subterfuge and cannot be a substitute for value judgment.”).
86
Indeed, according to the American Academy of Actuaries, “in insurance it is often impossible to prove
statistically any postulated cause and effect relationship.” American Academy of Actuaries (AAA), Committee on
Risk Classification.
87
See supra Part I.B.2
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A second, logically distinct, objection to the use of characteristics that are not perceived
to be causally connected to risk is that using such characteristics can have the effect of masking
classification practices that are objectionable for reasons already noted, such as lack of
policyholder control or because they trade on socially suspect characteristics. For instance, the
primary objection to insurers’ use of credit scores to rate individuals is that this simply proxies
for other, more objectionable, policyholder characteristics, such as race and income. 88 This
argument is logically distinct from the differential inaccuracy point because it is based on the
notion that the lack of understanding of the connection between the characteristic and the risk
masks some unfair result.
5. Privacy
A final fairness-based factor in evaluating the propriety of insurer risk-classification
measures is policyholder privacy. Although the purchase of insurance is usually voluntary,
insurance is often a practical pre-requisite to a wide range of modern necessities, such as driving
and owning a home. Consequently, allowing insurers to demand certain highly personal pieces
of information – such as HIV status, genetic information, or sexual orientation – is often viewed
as unduly intrusive. 89 More recently, there are also concerns that insurers violate policyholder
privacy when they acquire information for underwriting without meaningful cooperation or
consent from policyholders. This might include information about consumers’ browsing
histories and purchasing patterns that individuals do not reasonably expect will be available to
insurers in underwriting.
II. Predicting State Insurance Law and Regulation
This Part attempts to translate the broad range of normative factors discussed in Part I
into specific predictions about the contours of state insurance anti-discrimination law. Because
state insurance law and regulation is ultimately a political exercise, it attempts to balance the
conflicting normative concerns discussed in Part I with the political realities of state insurance
regulation. The principal goal of this Part is simply to provide a framework for analyzing the
data regarding the actual pattern of state laws governing insurer risk classification, which are
reviewed in Part III. Given the tentative nature of our hypotheses, and how easy it would be for
the balance of concerns to be given slightly different weight in different contexts, we will not be
shocked to find that the results diverge from our predictions.
A. Setting the Stage: Key Assumptions and the Political Economy of Insurance
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Federal Trade Commission, Credit-Based Insurance Scores: Impacts on Consumers of Automobile
Insurance (July
2007),
available
at
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/07/P044804FACTA_Report_CreditBased_lnsurance_Scores.pdf>.
89
See, e.g., Sandra E. Stone, HIV Testing and Insurance Applicants: Exploring Constitutional Alternatives to
Statutory Protections, 19 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1163, 1181-83 (1992).
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Drawing from two distinct literatures on insurance discrimination, Part I identified the
efficiency and fairness considerations that a benevolent legislature might consider in deciding
whether to restrict an insurer’s ability to discriminate with respect to a particular characteristic in
the underwriting process. But how might these various normative considerations affect which
particular state laws get enacted? Making such predictions is fraught with difficulty, for two
general reasons. First, fairness and efficiency concerns often, though not always, cut in opposite
directions. Trading off efficiency and fairness concerns is what lawmakers are asked to do every
day, but predicting the outcome of such balancing is no easy task.
The second difficulty arises from the fact that lawmaking is messy. There are of course
many different theories of how law gets made. Interest group theories tend to view legal rules—
statutes and regulations and even court decisions—as outputs of a market-like process in which
interested parties use the lawmaking process to “purchase” legal outcomes that further their
interests. 90 From this perspective, the arguments from Part I that are most likely to impact
legislative outcomes are those that impact insurers’ bottom lines. By contrast, public interest
theories tend to be more optimistic about what motivates legislatures, agencies, and judges and
thus more optimistic about the nature and quality of the laws they produce. 91 On this more rosy
view, all of the fairness and efficiency arguments developed in part I should carry actual weight
with lawmakers, whether the mechanism for this result is the altruism of the legislators
themselves or the existence of effective politicians who are able to convert good policy
arguments into effective political leverage. The best theories of the lawmaking process, of
course, adopt a blend of these competing approaches. Such blended theories take seriously the
political influence of relatively small but well-organized and highly motivated interest groups,
while simultaneously acknowledging the power of the diffuse majority with respect to issues that
they care about—or are made to care about. We take a blended approach in this Article.
There is support for taking such an approach in the political science literature. The
definitive study of the political economy of the insurance industry is The Political Economy of
Regulation: The Case of Insurance, by Kenneth J. Meier. 92 Meier concluded that no single
theory could fully describe the landscape of insurance regulation. Rather, insurance regulation is
a multi-faceted and complex activity that is influenced by a number of competing and often
conflicting interests. To be sure, insurance companies often do get their way in the regulatory
domain, even on occasion at the expense policyholders’ best interests—or at least what some
consumer interest group regards as their best interests. 93 At the same time, though, insurers are
90

See, e.g,, Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An
Interest Group Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223, 227-33 (1986)
91
See JAMES Q. WILSON, THE RISE OF THE BUREAUCRATIC STATE (1975).
92
KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: THE CASE OF INSURANCE (1988).
93
Robert Hunter, A Failure of Oversight in Need of Rescue: Insurance Regulation, 13 NY Bar Association
Journal of Government, Law and Policy 2 (2011); Daniel Schwarcz, Preventing Capture Through Consumer
Empowerment Programs: Some Evidence from Insurance Regulation, in PREVENTING CAPTURE (David Moss &
Daniel Carpenter, eds.) (Cambridge, 2012).
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not always able to completely capture state regulation. In part, this is because the insurance
industry is heterogeneous with respect to many issues, as property/casualty insurers sometimes
have different interests than life insurers and large companies sometimes have different interests
than small insurers. 94 But it is also because consumer groups and political entrepreneurs can
organize consumer opposition to certain industry-friendly positions, and, in many cases, highly
motivated regulators or “bureaucrats” effectively advocate for their own vision of the public
interest. 95 Additionally, scrutiny of insurance issues at the federal level can often trigger state
regulatory reform. 96
B. Predictions
1. Efficiency based predictions
Adverse selection: As discussed in Part I, one major efficiency cost of disallowing
insurers’ ability to classify according to certain characteristics is that it inhibits insurers’ ability
to combat the problem of adverse selection. Adverse selection is not merely a problem of social
efficiency; it threatens insurers’ ability to make a profit by insuring particular risks.
Additionally, adverse selection can actually undermine fairness-based rationales for limiting
discrimination, at least if it is sufficiently severe to produce a death spiral or if insurers can
combat it by segregating risks indirectly by offering different levels of coverage. Thus, we
predict that, for those line/characteristic combinations where adverse selection is especially
problematic, state anti-discrimination laws will tend to be relatively weak on average because (i)
some insurers will be strongly motivated to ensure this result, (ii) other industry players will have
little reason to oppose this result, and (iii) this result is potentially consistent with fairness-based
arguments.
Adverse selection is a bigger problem for some line/characteristic combinations than for
others, and so we expect to see relatively weak risk-classification regulation in those lines of
insurance in which adverse selection is an especially severe problem. For example, as discussed
in Part I, there are reasons to believe that adverse selection may be an especially difficult
problem for life insurers. First, life insurance is one area where there is a possibility of overinsurance that does not exist in the same way with other types of insurance, because, unlike other
types of insurance, life insurance policies do not contain coordination-of-coverage or other
insurance provisions. 97 Second, there is a strong secondary market in life insurance, but not in
other types of insurance, which increases the value to insureds of successfully adversely
selecting into life insurance pools in particular. 98 Third, life, and to a lesser extent health,
insurers face substantial product design and legal restrictions in their ability to cancel or non94

Meier, supra note 98, at at 167.
Id.
96
Id; See also Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Fixing the Lack of Transparency in Insurance
Consumer Protection, U.C.L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2013).
97
See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
98
See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
95
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renew policies, because they must generally do so within the statutory incontestability period.99
Fourth, life insurance policyholders are often keenly aware of both their risk characteristics (such
as age and gender) and how they effect mortality risk. 100 Finally, life insurance is generally not
legally or practically required for policyholders. 101 Moreover, there are various substitute
financial products for many forms of life insurance and particularly annuity products. These
factors will tend to increase the elasticity of demand and therefore the risk for adverse
selection. 102
Moral hazard: Moral hazard also threatens insurers’ profitability, and thus we would
make a similar prediction here: for those line/characteristic combinations where moral hazard is
especially problematic, state anti-discrimination laws will tend to be relatively weak. Because
moral hazard is only an issue with respect to factors over which an insured has some control,103
this moral-hazard prediction is consistent with a fairness-based prediction: for characteristics
considered to be totally within an insured’s control, state anti-discrimination laws will tend to be
weaker on average than for characteristics that are considered totally outside of the insured’s
control. Likewise, since whether a characteristic is within a person’s control can be considered a
matter of degree, we would predict that the less within one’s control a characteristic is the
stronger will be the applicable anti-discrimination law.
Insurer use of underlying characteristic: For characteristics that do not provide any
predictive value to insurers, like zip code in disability insurance, we predict that the average
level of regulation will be very weak, unless there is some strong expressive or symbolic reason
for regulation. 104 For characteristics that may have predictive value to insurers, but which
insurers nonetheless have not historically used, we predict that the average level of regulation
will still be weak, but less weak than above.
Other efficiency considerations: We predict that the other assorted efficiency arguments
– including the socially wasteful expenditure of resources, the potential public good nature of
risk classification, efficient redistribution, and positive externalities of risky behavior – will tend
not to impact legislative and regulatory choices. All of these efficiency arguments would tend to
support risk classification regulation (in contrast to those noted above) on the basis of broad
social efficiency benefits. 105 But interest groups will tend not to coalesce around these social
efficiency arguments because their benefits accrue not to small and easily identifiable groups, but
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See Part I, supra.
See part I, supra. Whether policyholders fully understand the link between their mortality risk and their
gender may be variable. See Howell Jackson & Allison Hoffman, Retiree Out-of-Pocket Healtcare Spending: A Study
of Consumer Expectations and Policy Implications, 39 AM. J. LAW & MED. 1 (2013).
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See part I, supra.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
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to the diffuse public. 106 Similarly, while we expect that state lawmakers will be publiclyoriented in some cases, we expect that none of the efficiency arguments in support of riskclassification regulation are sufficiently large or publicly salient to generate substantial
momentum on this basis alone. This especially true these restrictions may limit insurers’
potential profit, and thus face industry opposition.
2. Fairness based predictions
Control and social solidarity: As mentioned above, we predict that the greater the
control an insured has over a characteristic, the weaker will be the average insurance antidiscrimination law, both for efficiency (moral hazard) and fairness reasons. The other reason
why we expect this to be true is that, insofar as insurance anti-discrimination laws are about
achieving some degree of social solidarity (or redistribution from better off to less well off), such
arguments tend to be most persuasive, or easily accepted, in situations in which individuals lack
control over their circumstances. 107
Socially suspect characteristics: Here we have two general predictions, the strong version
and the weak version. The strong version is that, when there is general agreement that a
characteristic is socially suspect (based for example on constitutional jurisprudence), every
jurisdiction will have a law forbidding insurers from using that characteristic across all lines,
even if the characteristic may not have any predictive value in a particular line. As a proxy for
the strong-version prediction we use the Supreme Court’s concept of suspect classifications,
which includes race, religion, and national origin, and quasi-suspect classifications, which
includes gender. 108 The weaker prediction is that, for such characteristics, at least the average
level of anti-discrimination regulation will be stronger than the average level of regulation of
other characteristics. Also, if there are characteristics that are well-known, or even widely
suspected, proxies for socially suspect characteristics, such as zip code as a proxy for race, we
expect similar results, although probably not as strong: that is, there will be fewer states with
106

See Part II.A, supra.
The social solidarity/redistribution idea also suggests a cross-state prediction, one that we do not yet have
the data fully to test: Given that insurance anti-discrimination laws can be viewed as a form of redistribution from
the better off (the ones without the high-risk characteristic) to the less well off (the ones with the high-risk
characteristic), we predict that states in which voters are relatively hostile to government redistribution via the tax
and transfer system will have relatively weak insurance anti-discrimination laws. We expect this effect to be
strongest where the redistributive argument is strongest: for example, where there is relatively little control on the
part of the insured. A simple albeit rough way of differentiating between redistribution-friendly and redistributionhostile states would be to look at the blue state/red state divide in recent Presidential elections, where the issue of the
appropriate degree of redistribution (through income tax progressivity and health care finance) has been a key
component of the campaigns. Relatedly, states in which voters are relatively open to anti-discrimination law in
other contexts (as shown in survey research or in the existence of state anti-discrimination laws of other types) will
be relatively more likely to have strong insurance anti-discrimination laws. Perhaps the blue state/red state divide
would work here as well.
108
See supra discussion at note __. Obviously, the equal protection clause has no binding effect on private
insurance companies, but rather serves only as a limitation on state power. We use the concept only as a rough
proxy for characteristics that are universally regarded as inappropriate bases for risk segregation.
107
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outright bans, and the average strictness of the regulation will be less, than for the socially
suspect classification itself.
Correlation and Causation: The correlation/causation concern from Part I suggests that
stronger anti-discrimination laws will exist for characteristics that do not have a clear causal
connection to risk. At the same time, insurers will presumably lobby extensively to use
characteristics that provide useful risk-related information, irrespective of their causal link to
loss. Our prediction then is that, there should be stronger restrictions on average for traits that
are perceived not to have a causal relationship with the risk they are said to reflect.
Privacy: We predict that characteristics that are considered private and/or that require
effort by the policyholder to acquire will be more highly regulated.
3. Applying the predictions to the nine characteristics
How will these general predictions play out for the various line/characteristic
combinations that we examine below?
Race, national origin, and religion (the “big three”): Race, national origin, and religion
have a special place in this country’s history; and, as discussed above, discrimination on the
basis of these three characteristics has been subject to stricter scrutiny in American law than have
other characteristics. Therefore, relying on the general predictions above with respect to socially
suspect classifications, we predict that race, national origin, and religion will be prohibited
characteristics in every state across every line. A weaker form of the prediction is that these
three characteristics will be more strictly regulated on average than will the other
characteristics. We make these predictions for all three of these characteristics, even though not
all of them correlate in an obvious way with the risks associated with all five lines of insurance.
Gender: Gender-based discrimination in insurance has long been controversial. 109 And
differential treatment on the basis of gender is, of course, in many contexts widely considered
unacceptable or illegal. 110 Nevertheless, there does not seem to be the same level of agreement—
as there is for the race, religion, and national origin—that drawing gender-based distinctions is
always wrong. As discussed above, federal constitutional law treats gender as only a quasisuspect classification; as a result, laws that discriminate on the basis of gender are subject to an
intermediate level of scrutiny. This means a more searching scrutiny for laws that discriminate
109

Indeed, the question of the legality under the federal employment discrimination laws of gendered
differences in insurance (or pension) premiums and payouts sparked one of the more important and interesting
debates regarding what constitutes unfair or illicit discrimination in the insurance context and what constitutes
merely a fair allocation of costs. Lea Brilmayer, Douglas Laycock & Teresa A. Sullivan, The Efficient Use of
Group Averages as Nondiscrimination: A Rejoinder to Professor Benston, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 250 (1983); see also
Spencer L. Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination: Manhart, 4 AM. BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 83, 108 (1979)
(“Age discrimination is so basic in life insurance and annuities that any serious challenge to it seems unlikely.”)..
110
John J. Donohue III, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An Economic Perspective, 56 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1337, 1365-66 (1989).
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on the basis of gender than for laws that discriminate on the basis of other characteristics, but
less searching scrutiny than for race, national origin, or religion. Therefore, we predict that there
will be more variability across the states with respect to laws regulating insurance gender
discrimination than with respect to laws restricting the use of the big three, perhaps with states
clustering around either end of the spectrum. In addition, because gender equity arguments tend
to be used to improve the lot of women relative to men, and gender equity is a salient public
issue that attracts various public interest groups, we also predict that the gender discrimination
will be more strictly regulated on average for health insurance (where gender-rated policies
often result in higher premiums for women) than for auto insurance (where gender-rated policies
result in higher premiums for men). However, with respect to life insurance, we predict that the
laws regulating gender discrimination will be on average relatively weak, since adverse
selection in the life insurance market is especially problematic. Regarding property/casualty
insurance, as there seems to be no conceivable correlation between those risks, we predict either
states will cluster around no regulation, or, alternatively, states will cluster around forbidding
the use of gender in p/c insurance on symbolic or expressive grounds. It is also possible that
there will be a bi-modal distribution along those lines.
Sexual orientation: Unlike with race, national origin, religion, and gender, legal
classifications on the basis of an individual’s sexual orientation has not been identified by the
Supreme Court as deserving special scrutiny. In addition, unlike race, national origin, and
gender, there are no federal laws forbidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in
employment. 111 However, there are state laws that forbid discrimination on the basis sexual
orientation, 112 and some lower courts have held that sexual orientation should be a suspect or
quasi-suspect characteristic. 113 It is safe to say that discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is at least highly controversial. Moreover, discrimination in insurance on the basis of
sexual orientation would also implicate substantial privacy concerns. Thus, we predict that on
average, with respect to life and health insurance, sexual orientation will be a moderately
regulated characteristic, less regulated than big three and somewhat less regulated than gender,
but more heavily regulated than age. Moreover, there may be some cross-state variation.
Because there is little reason to believe that sexual orientation correlates with property or liability
risks, we expect relatively little if any regulation of sexual orientation in the auto and
property/casualty lines.
Age: We expect that age will have the lowest average regulatory score of all the risk
characteristics we are studying. First, age is not a suspect classification, at least not by
constitutional standards. Second, age tends to correlate causally with several important areas of
risk (mortality, health, and perhaps disability risks), thereby increasing the perceived fairness of
111
112

See, e.g., Sexual Orientation Non-Discrimination Act (NY 2002).
Windsor v. United States, 12-2335-CV, 2012 WL 4937310 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2012) (finding that sexual
orientation is a quasi-suspect classification and, on that basis, striking down DOMA as applied to the federal estate
tax).
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rating on that basis. 114 Third, age can present serious adverse selection problems for insurers,
since individual insureds know their own age and the risks associated with their age. 115 Fourth,
social solidarity arguments with respect to age are relatively weak, since individuals can spread
risk over their lifetime through various income smoothing products. These factors are likely most
important with respect to life insurance, where the casual connection between age and risk is
obvious and regulatory restrictions would create large adverse selection concerns. Therefore,
for life insurance, we predict that almost every state will either have no regulation or will
explicitly permit the use of age. Regulatory restrictions on age could also create adverse
selection problems with disability and health insurance, though these may be less severe because
these lines of coverage are often sold on a group basis. As such, we expect more variation
among the states for the use of age in health and disability, perhaps fewer with rules specifically
permitting age-based classifications than with life insurance. With respect to auto insurance, age
is a relatively strong proxy for driving risks, meaning that insurers have an interest in lobbying
against age-limitations. At the same time, the causal link between age and auto risk is contestable
potentially complicating the fairness argument. Even if age is causally connected with auto
risks, it is arguably unfair to group all similarly-aged drivers together. 116 These concerns lead us
to expect variation across states with respect to whether, and how, insurers can use age in auto
insurance underwriting. Because we are unaware of any correlation between age and non-auto
property/casualty risks, we expect that most states will not regulate of the use of age with respect
to property/casualty insurance.
Credit score and zip code: Credit score and zip code are not, by themselves, socially
suspect characteristics. However, as mentioned in Part I, some commentators have argued that
credit score and zip code are used by auto and home insurers as proxies for socially suspect
characteristics, such as race. By contrast, insurers argue that credit scores and zip codes are
predictive of loss experience for reasons having nothing to do with these factors. Given the
history of this debate, we predict that there will be a substantial number of states that limit,
though few outright prohibitions of, the use of credit score and zip code in auto insurance and
for homeowners’ insurance. However, because insurers seem to have done a better job of public
relations and of lobbying, we expect to see a fair amount of variation among states, perhaps with
a bi-modal distribution of some states clustering around no regulation and others clustering
around limits. We expect little regulation with respect to credit score and zip code for disability,
health, and life insurance,, since we are unaware of any correlation between risk in these lines
and credit score or zip code. 117 More generally, we expect the average regulatory score to be
higher for zip code and credit score than for age, but lower than for race, national origin, and
religion.
114

See Part I.C, supra.
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This is the differential inaccuracy point discussed in Part I. See Part I.C, supra.
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Genetics: Laws limiting the ability of insurers, especially health and life insurers, to use
genetic tests in underwriting insurance can be defended on redistributive and privacy grounds,
for reasons discussed above. They can also be defended on efficiency grounds, as insurer usage
of this characteristic could deter individual knowledge acquisition. Therefore, we would expect
that anti-discrimination laws will on average tend to be more restrictive for genetic testing than
for characteristics that do not present such an argument (such as age). We would expect no
regulation of genetics for auto or p/c insurance, as there is no apparent connection to those
risks. With respect to life insurance, we would predict that genetic testing would be permitted or
not regulated in almost all states, for adverse selection reasons. Given the federal law forbidding
genetics in health insurance, we predict that for health most states would prohibit. Because
disability insurance presents greater moral hazard concerns, we expect more variation—more
willingness to allow.
All of our predictions are summarized in the following table. The columns represent the
five lines of insurance, and the rows are for the nine characteristics we examined.
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State Insurance Anti-Discrimination Laws: Predictions
Auto

Disability

Health

Life

Property/
Casualty

Race

Prohibited across all
states (highest
average level of
strictness)

Prohibited
across all states
(highest average
level of
strictness)

Prohibited across all states
(highest average level of
strictness)

Prohibited across all
states (highest
average level of
strictness)

Prohibited across all
states (highest
average level of
strictness)

National
origin

Same as race

Same as race

Same as race

Same as race

Same as race

Religion

Same as race

Same as race

Same as race

Same as race

Same as race

Gender

Variation across
states; with some
states permitting
and others
prohibiting or
limiting, possible bimodal distribution
(bmd)

Variation across
states; some
states
permitting and
others
prohibiting or
limiting

Variation across states;
some states permitting and
others prohibit or limit;
fewer and weaker
limitations than with auto
insurance on average,
because of AS concerns and
because discrimination here
tends to help women

No regulation or
explicitly permitted
in substantially all
states, mainly
because of adverse
selection and
discrimination here
helps women

No regulation in
substantially all
states, because not
relevant to risk, or
prohibited on
expressive grounds,
possiblebmd

Sexual
Orient.

No regulation,
because not relevant
to risk

Variation across
states (some
states
prohibiting;
others not
regulating;
possible bmd)

Variation across states
(some states prohibiting;
others not regulating;
possible bmd)

Variation across
states (some states
prohibiting; others
not regulating;
possible bmd)

No regulation,
because not relevant
to risk

Age

limited
regulation

limited regulation

no regulation or
explicitly permit

No regulation

No regulation

No regulation

No regulation

Zip Code

limited regulation,
with some variation
across states
Variation across
states; with some
not regulating and
others limiting on
proxy grounds
Same as credit score

Same as credit
score

Same as credit score

Same as credit score

Variation across
states; with some
not regulating and
others limiting on
proxy grounds
Same as credit score

Genetics

No regulation

Relatively weak
regulation on
average, but
with variation
across states

Most states prohibiting, as
in federal law; or no states
prohibiting, because of
federal law

No regulation or
specifically
permitted, because
of adverse selection

Credit
Score

No regulation
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Part III. The Data
A. Empirical Methodology and Coding of State Laws
Although there has been considerable theorizing about the extent to which insurance
companies should be allowed to discriminate among insureds in the underwriting process, there
has been almost no research on the question what the law actually permits. It is a surprisingly
complex and difficult issue. Because the governing law in this area is primarily state law, we
first had to identify and analyze the relevant state statutes and regulations in all 50 states as well
as the District of Columbia, as of 2012. To make the project manageable, we focused
specifically on how states have regulated insurers’ use of the nine characteristics – race, religion,
national origin, gender, age, genetic testing, credit score, sexual orientation, and geographic
location – and we focused on the five largest lines of insurance – life, health, disability, auto, and
property/casualty. 118 This exercise revealed statutes at all levels of generality: statutes that
limited or prohibited all “unfair discrimination” in all lines of insurance with no mention of
particular traits; 119 statutes that limited or prohibited “unfair discrimination” generally within a
particular line of insurance; 120 and statutes that limited or prohibited the use of one or more
specific characteristics either for all lines 121 or for a specific line of insurance. 122

118

With one large exception, the category of “property/casualty” insurance includes first-party property
insurance and all liability insurance, including homeowners’ insurance coverage. The exception is auto insurance,
which includes both first party and liability components and is so large in terms of premium volume and the like that
it was given its own category.
119
For example, Texas law provides that an insurer may not use a rate that is “unfairly discriminatory.” Tex.
Ins. Code § 560.002(a)(2)(c). Oklahoma, by contrast, treats “unfair discrimination” as a type of prohibited “unfair
or deceptive act or practice.” 36 Okl. St. § 1204(7). In total, 28 states have general statutes forbidding “unfair
discrimination” or “unfairly discriminatory” rates by insurers or both across all (or multiple) lines of insurance.
Those states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
120
For example, North Carolina prohibits “unfair discrimination” in life insurance rates. N.C.G.S § 58-58-35; §
58-63-15(7)(a). Likewise, South Dakota. SDCL § 58-33-12. In fact, every state except Iowa, Utah, Vermont,
Washington, and Wisconsin has a statute prohibiting “unfair discrimination” by insurers or “unfairly discriminatory”
rates or both in connection with life insurance in particular. Another example of general anti-discrimination statutes
that apply to specific lines would be property/casualty insurance. There are 27 states, and the District of Columbia,
that such statutes. See, e.g., O.R.C. §3901.21(M) (Ohio); Gen.Laws 1956, § 27-44-5(Rhode Island); and MCL §
500.2403 (Michigan).
121
For example, Delaware has a general statute forbidding the use of race in connection with any type of
insurance. 18 Del Code 2304(22) (“It shall be an unlawful practice for any insurance company licensed to do
business in this State to discriminate in any way because of the insured's race, color, religion, sexual orientation or
national origin”). Arkansas, by contrast, has a general statute that limits but does not outright prohibit the use of
race in any area of insurance. Specifically, it forbids “refusing to insure or continue to insure an individual or risks
solely because of the individual’s race, color, creed, national origin, citizenship, status as a victim of domestic abuse,
or sex.” A.C.A. § 23-66-206(14)(G)(i). This very common type of limitation statute, found in many states, seems to
suggest that race, and other suspect categories, may be used, but only if they can be backed up by accurate and
reliable actuarial data.
122
For example, Utah has a statute forbidding the use of race in insurance ratemaking for property/casualty
insurance in particular. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-19a-202(3)(c). Ohio has an anti-discrimination provision that is
particular both to race and to property/casualty insurance; however, that statute forbids the use of taking race into
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Based on these state statutes, we assigned a code for each line/trait combination for each
state. We ended up with six possible codes that we arranged along a continuum, from those that
are least restrictive of insurers’ underwriting decisions to those that are most restrictive. At one
end of the continuum are statutes that expressly permit the use of a particular trait, and at the
other end are outright prohibitions of particular traits. Between these two extremes, the “general
restriction” statutes (that is, the general unfair discrimination statutes) were treated as being more
restrictive than the absence of any relevant statute, but as being less restrictive than statutes that
specifically mention the trait in question. The entire continuum is reproduced below: 123
Expressly Permit (-1) — The state has a statute expressly or impliedly permitting insurers to
take the characteristic into account.
No Law on Point (0) — The state laws are silent with respect to the particular characteristic.
General Restriction (1) — The state has a statute that generally prohibits “unfair
discrimination,” either across all lines of insurance or in some lines of insurance, but that statute
does not provide any explanation as to what constitutes unfair discrimination and does not single
out any particular trait for limitation.
Characteristic-Specific Weak Limitation (2) — The state has a statute that limits the use of a
particular characteristic in either issuance, renewal, or cancellation.
Characteristic-Specific Strong Limitation (3) — The state has a statute that prohibits the use
of a particular characteristic when the policy is either issued, renewed, or cancelled, or the state
has a statute that limits but does not completely prohibit the use of a particular characteristic in
rate-setting.
Characteristic-Specific Prohibition (4) — The state has a statute the expressly prohibits
insurers from taking into account a specific characteristic in setting rates.
After arriving at an initial code based upon the state statutes for every line of insurance,
for every characteristic, in every state, we went back and examined judicial decisions and
administrative rulings within each jurisdiction to determine if the initial code was changed by a
decision. Surprisingly, out of the 2295 trait/line combinations (9 traits times 5 lines of insurance
times 51 jurisdictions), only 16 total trait/line combinations were changed. In sum, judicial and

account in decisions regarding whether to issue or renew a policy. O.R.C. §4112.02(H)(4). In total, 33 states and
the District of Columbia either limit or forbid the use of race by property/casualty insurers. Interestingly, only six
states – Illinois, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, and Virginia – impose any limit on the use of
gender in life insurance.
123
We acknowledge that this continuum from permissive to stringent restrictions is neither perfectly continuous
nor perfectly scaled, but it is the best that can be done given the nature of the data. It allows us to “see” the data in a
way that makes it more accessible. As with any grading scale, the differences between immediately contiguous
scores (e.g., the difference between B+ and an A-) can be slim in some cases. But the hope is that averages, across
lots of measurements, will have some meaning; and the differences in the extremes (e.g., the A and the C) will likely
reveal important differences.
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administrative interpretation of the state statutes had very little effect on the final coding
results. 124
Our approach to coding the various laws has an important limitation. First, our coding
continuum, is, for simplicity, equidistant, even though the actual laws are not. That is, we assume
that the distant between zero to one is similar to the distant between one and two, Second, and
more importantly, many of the various intermediate limitations—which are, after all, laws
requiring a showing of statistical correlation between the characteristic and the risks in
question— may, in practice, be relatively simple for insurers to satisfy. In those cases, there will
be little difference between strong limitations, weak limitations, general limitations, no mentions,
and express permits. Instead, the important distinction will be between the states that have
outright prohibitions with respect to a particular line/characteristic combination and those states
that do not.

B. The results
In this section we discuss the extent to which the data are consistent with the hypotheses
developed in part II. To do so, we report some basic summary statistics. In some cases we
report average strictness scores. That is, we simply take the average of the codes for a given set
of states for a particular characteristic or line/characteristic combination. We also examine the
individual state scores that make up these averages, the variance in state laws and the extent to
which distributions tend to be bi-modal. We ran various statistical tests on the data, but
eyeballing the graphs proved to be just as revealing. Those graphs, for each line/characteristic
combination, are included in the appendix.
1. Race, Religion, National origin (The “big three”)
Figures 1 to 3 present our finding regarding the “big three” for auto insurance, yet much
of the analysis remains the same for other lines of insurance.

124

Among the few but interesting exceptions to this conclusion is Guidry v. Pellerin Life, in which a federal
court applying Louisiana’s general unfair discrimination statute holds that discrimination on the basis of race is life
insurance is not unfair, discussed below.
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Treatment of Race in Auto Insurance

Figure 1- Distribution of States’ Scores for Race, in Auto Insurance

Treatment of National Origin in Auto Insurance
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Figure 2 - Distribution of States’ Scores for National Origin, in Auto Insurance
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Treatment of Religion in Auto Insurance
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Figure 3- Distribution of States’ Scores for Religion, in Auto Insurance
Perhaps the most surprising finding was the fact that states do not uniformly prohibit
insurers from using race, religion, and national origin—contradicting our strong prediction about
the big three characteristics. Figure 4 below reveals that only seven states have forbidden the use
of race, national origin, and religion across all lines of insurance. Those states are California,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. Two additional
states—Georgia and North Carolina—prohibit the use by insurers of race and national origin, but
do not apply the same prohibition to religion. In contrast, only one state, Louisiana, explicitly
permits the use of race in life insurance.
Characteristic

Race
National Origin
Religion
Gender
Age
Credit Score
Genetic Testing
Sexual Orientation

Number of Jurisdictions Completely
Prohibiting Use of Characteristic in All
Five Lines of Insurance
9 (CA,GA,NJ,NM,NY,NC,TX,WA,WI)
9 (CA,GA,NJ,NM,NY,NC,TX,WA,WI)
7 (CA,NJ,NM,NY,TX,WA,WI)
1
(MT)
0
0
0
5 (CA, DE,FL, KY, UT,VT, WA)
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Zip Code

0
Figure 4

The next finding observable in Figures 1 to 3 above is that regardless of the level of
restrictiveness the treatment of the “big three” is highly correlated (with an average Spearman’s
rho of 0.9) in all states. In fact, as these 3 graphs show, the scores per line of insurance are
almost identical for these three characteristics with property/casualty insurance being the most
restrictive line of insurance, then auto, health, life and lastly disability insurance.
Our weaker prediction of course was confirmed: As Figure 5 shows, more states forbid
insurers from using race, national origin, and religion across all lines of coverage than for any of
the other characteristics. In addition, the average level of regulation of the big three is
significantly stricter (at less than 1% level), applying our strictness coding system described
above, than for the other six characteristics we studied, as shown in Figure 5. Interestingly, the
prohibition on using religious affiliation is stricter on average than the prohibition on using race
or national origin.
Figure 5 also shows that at the most general level the regulation of the various
characteristics follows the federal constitutional law principles where race, national origin and
religion are suspect classifications, gender is quasi-suspect and sexual orientation is not far
behind.
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Figure 5

While these results confirm our hypothesis that the “big three” will be treated the same,
there remains an interesting question: why is the use of race, national origin, and religion not
prohibited in every state in the country? We have a number of theories.
First, perhaps state regulators and their constituents are under the impression that federal
law already bans the use of these characteristics. At least two federal statutes could conceivably
be interpreted to forbid discrimination on these bases by insurers. First, the Fair Housing Act
[“FHA”] makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to
refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to
any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 125 Although
federal courts were split about the FHA’s applicability to homeowners’ insurance, 126 new
regulations now make clear that the statute does indeed apply in this domain, thus prohibiting
racial discrimination in homeowners’ insurance. 127 Even so, however, the statute does not affect
any other type of insurance.
The other federal antidiscrimination law that could conceivably be applied to limit insurer
discrimination is 42 USC 1981, which forbids racial discrimination in the making of contracts.
But no court has interpreted Section 1981 in this manner, and at least one federal district court
has held that Section 1981 did not apply to a claim that life insurers in Louisiana charged higher
premiums to African American insureds than to other insureds. 128 The court noted that Section
1981 requires proof of intentional discrimination on the basis of race, and the evidence in the
case supported the defendant insurer’s claim that any race-based premium differential reflected
differences in risks. That is the only case we found addressing the application of Section 1981 to
insurance transactions; and it went in favor of the insurer. 129 Thus, if states have failed to enact
125

42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2000) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351 (6th Cir. 1995)(holding that the McCarranFerguson Act does not reverse-preempt the application of the FHA to homeowners’ insurance), NAACP v. Am.
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 E2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992) (same), Nat'l Fair Hous. Alliance, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2002), Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 94 Ohio Misc. 2d 151
(Ohio C.P. 1997), and Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 472 E Supp. 1106 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
127
See HUD Rule Imposes Disparate Impact Standard on Insurance, Insurance Compliance Insight.
128
Guidry v. Pellerin Life Ins. Co., 364 F.Supp.2d 592 (2005).
129
This case is the reason we code Louisiana as being the only state that expressly permits race to be used for a
particular line of insurance, here life insurance. This coding, however, should be taken with a grain of salt. A
close reading of the Guidry case leaves unclear whether the insurer in the case was using explicitly insurance
premiums that had been calculated explicitly on the basis of race. It is clear from the opinion that the insurer was
systematically and knowingly charging African Americans a higher rate than whites, owing to a higher average risk
of mortality for African Americans. Indeed, the opinion says that, “up until April1, 1982, Louisiana law mandated
the use of separate published rates for whites and African-Americans.” But it is not clear from the opinion whether
this dual-pricing resulted from insurers’ asking about race on their insurance applications or rather from insurers’
using proxies for race. Of course, even if proxies for race are used, if they are knowingly used in order to sort
people according to race, which is clearly the implication of the opinion, then it would be the same as if race were
126

36
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/52

36

Avraham et al.:

prohibitions because they assumed that federal law already did the job, that assumption may be
mistaken. 130 In any event, this explanation would not explain the results for national origin and
religion.
Second, state legislatures may not have banned insurer usage of the big three because
they believe that insurers have stopped using race, national origin, and religion already and thus
that a law prohibiting their use would simply be unnecessary. In other words, perhaps the antidiscrimination regulatory work is already being done by informal social norms. On this view,
insurers understand that if they were to attempt to risk classify on the basis of race, for example,
that fact might be discovered, producing serious reputational repercussions. 131 There is probably
some explanatory power to this story. We in fact rarely if ever hear of insurers using race,
national origin or religion when underwriting individual insurance policies these days. 132
However, even if explicit discrimination on the basis of the big three is a rarity in insurance, it
does not follow that implicit forms of discrimination do not occur. Moreover, if social norms are
already discouraging the use of these characteristics, why do so many states have laws
forbidding their use? If the answer has to do with the expressive or symbolic effect of the laws,
then it remains a puzzle why only some states care enough about this sort of expressive or
symbolic benefit to enact the prohibitions? 133
Third, and related to the norms explanation, maybe the lack of a universal ban has
something to do with timing. It could be that a number of states enacted prohibitions on the use
of the big three characteristics and then those laws contributed to creating a norm against their
use, at which point the other states did not need to adopt the same laws. The data for this paper
do not allow us to examine timing issues, as we are looking only at the law as currently enacted.
But we are in the process of doing research on how the laws have changed over time, in all 51
jurisdictions, which may permit us to look at this possibility.
2. Gender
Figure 6 presents the main finding for gender.

directly asked about on the application. The key fact seems to be an absence of evidence of racial animus on the
part of the insurer, and there reason the court found no evidence was that the dual-pricing in fact correlated with
actuarial risk.
130
J. Gabriel McGlamery, Raced Based Underwriting and the Death of Burial Insurance, 15 Conn. Ins. L. J.
531 (2009) (suggesting a similar story to explain why life insurers stopped using race decades ago, despite the fact
that it was technically legal to do so).
131
Id..
132
There are insurers who ask about religious affiliation. [example: divorce insurance]
133
In a subsequent study that looks more a cross-state variation, taking into account differences in state voters
preferences for such things as fairness, we may be able to find some answers to these questions.
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Figure 6 - Distribution of States’ Scores for Gender, by Line of Insurance

Figure 6 shows thatmany states permit the usage of gender, especially in life and health
insurance. As figure six suggests, the average level of regulation for gender risk classification is,
38
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as we predicted, less strict than for race, religion, and national origin but more strict than age.
This difference is statistically significant. 134 Figure six is also consistent with our prediction
that there would be a large degree of variation across states. Finally, Figure six is somewhat
consistent with our prediction that for gender discrimination in auto, disability, and health
insurance, state would vary in the intensity of their regulation, with some states clustering around
strong limitations and others around no limitations or specific permissions.
The results are more mixed for another of our predictions: that the average score for
gender in auto and life insurance would be lower (less strict) than in health insurance because
discrimination by insurers in auto and life insurance tends to help women whereas discrimination
in health insurance tends to hurt them. Life insurance is indeed less regulated than health
insurance, but auto insurance is more regulated on average, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure Seven shows that the results are also mixed for our prediction that states would
tend to permit insurer discrimination for gender, with large number of “specifically permits.” 135

134

A Wilcoxon sign-rank test as well as a simple student t-test show a difference which is significant at less
than 1% between the “big three” and gender as well as between gender and sexual orientation, the closest
characteristic from below.However, for disability insurance there is no significant difference between the way the
“big three” and gender are treated. For life and health insurance, there is no significant difference between the way
gender and sexual orientation are treated.
135
Recall that this prediction was based on the adverse selection problems associated with individually
underwritten life insurance and because such discrimination actually benefits women.
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As Figure Seven shows, the average score for life insurance/gender is in fact lower than for the
other line/gender combinations. This difference is statistically significant in all cases, except
with respect to the difference between life and health. 136 Although there are a large number of
states that specifically permit the use of gender with life insurance, there are also a large number
that impose a strong limitation, which again generally means a requirement that the insurer be
able to show that gender correlates with loss claims. More consistent with our prediction is the
fact that only two states (Montana and North Carolina) forbid the use of gender in life insurance
underwriting.
Figure seven is even more inconsistent with our prediction of a low average score and
lots of “no mentions,” with respect to the use of gender in property/casualty insurance (excluding
auto insurance). 137” As Figure 7 shows, gender (just like the “big three” above) is more heavily
regulated in the property/casualty line than in any other line of insurance. Why is this? One
answer is that property/casualty insurers are, in fact, using gender more than we assumed. That
136

We use a Wilcoxon rank-sum test for unmatched data.
Recall that this was due to the fact that we believed there was no obvious correlation between gender and
non-auto liability and property risks. See Part II, supra. Figure four shows that our alternative prediction, that
there may be a bi-modal distribution between states that have no statute on point and those that have outright
prohibitions on other grounds was also not especially borne out, although there was a fair amount of variability.
137
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explains why there are almost no “no-mention” in property/casualty for gender. But why
restricting the use of gender and not permit it? Recall our discussion above that adverse
selection is less of a problem with property/casualty insurance than with some other lines of
insurance, such as life and health insurance. Alternatively, there is always the possibility that
insurers work together to pass these bans in order to limit the competition among them.

Another possibility is that state legislatures pass laws such as this not because they
believe they are needed to curb certain behavior on the part of insurers, but because the laws
create the (in these cases, false) impression that they are doing something productive. One can
see how such legislation could easily get passed. The insurers would not object, since the laws
restrict them from doing something that they do not want to do anyway. Indeed, insurers may
support such laws, whose passage may reduce the demand from voters for action on other fronts.
The insuring public also would not object, because, as far as they know, these pointless laws are
in fact constraining insurers from some socially harmful activity. Who pushes for such
legislation? Again, the legislators themselves, who need to give the impression they are doing
something, without offending an important constituency. 138
3. Sexual Orientation
For life/health insurance, we predicted a moderate level of average regulation for insurer
usage of sexual orientation: less strict than for the big three but stricter than for age. This
prediction is borne out in Figure 5. The difference is statistically significant. 139 Our prediction
that state laws on this topic would be variable also found some limited support in the data. Five
states have outright bans on the use of sexual orientation across all lines of insurance. 140 Sexual
orientation is the only characteristic other than the “Big three” and gender about which that can
be said in any state. This fits the federal constitutional law with respect to the role of sexual
orientation as a suspect classification compared with the big three and gender.
Nevertheless, the dominant response among states with respect to sexual orientation is to
have no specific regulation on sexual orientation at all, and this is true across all lines. With
respect to health insurance, for example, eighteen states either prohibit or strongly limit the use
of sexual orientation and all the other states have no specific regulation on sexual orientation, but

138

Amy Monahan has done research that explores this hypothesis. In particular, she has an article showing that
the health insurance mandates that states are most likely to pass are those that are already included in virtually every
health insurance policy in the state. She explains this result as an example of the legislatures-trying-to-lookproductive theory. Amy Monahan, Fairness versus Welfare in Health Insurance Content Regulation (working
paper) (January 6, 2012), available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1980764.
139
A Wilcoxon rank sum test shows the differences are significant at less than 1%
140
See Figure 4. Those states are California, Delaware, Utah, Vermont and Washington. Colorado would have
been the sixth, but for their failure to apply their prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to
auto insurance.
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have only general unfair discrimination laws.141 The treatment is similar with the other lines of
insurance.
What does all of this mean? There are a number of possibilities. First, perhaps the large
majority of states believe that their general unfair discrimination statues will be applied to sexual
orientation as well. Second, maybe state lawmakers believe that insurers will not use sexual
orientation in any event, for any of several reasons: (a) because insurers are constrained by
social norms, as they seem to be with race, religion, and national origin; (b) because insurers do
not see any strong correlation after all between insured risks and sexual orientation, and thus opt
not to invite the controversy. Indeed, when most general restrictions laws were enacted, sexual
orientation was probably not on states’ legislatures’ minds. It is an artifact of our coding that
sexual orientation gets so many category ones. It can be reasonably interpreted as category zerono law on point; (c) because insurers are skeptical of their ability to ascertain sexual orientation
reliably; or (d) because insurers have discovered other, more direct ways of getting at the sources
of risk in question (such as HIV tests).

141

The remaining line/characteristic specific charts are contained in the appendix.
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Treatment of Sexual Orientation in Life Insurance
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Figure 8 - Distribution of States’ Scores for Sexual Orientation, by Line of Insurance
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4. Age
Our general prediction that age would be the least regulated on average proved accurate,
as reflected in Figure 5.The difference between age and credit score (the closet category) is
significant in general at the 1% level, (although the difference is not significant for auto and
property/casualty lines of insurance). Our specific prediction with respect to life insurance
proved reasonably accurate as well: 39 states specifically permit the use of age in life insurance;
and the remaining states merely impose a general unfair discrimination limitation. Health
insurance is similar, but with less uniformity: 36 states permit the use of age in health insurance;
and the rest impose specific regulations. 142 Our predictions regarding the regulation of the use of
age in the auto insurance markets (variability across states) was in the ballpark, though the
amount of variation is somewhat more than we expected, as reflected in Figure 9, below.
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Twelve states impose either a strong or weak limitation, and one state, NY, prohibits the use of age in health
insurance.
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Treatment of Age in Disability Insurance

outrig
ht pro
hibitio
n

n

TX
PA
MI

stron
g lim
itatio

SD
NH
MO
FL

weak
limita
tion

l restr
iction

WI
WV
VT
UT
OR
OK
OH
NC
MD
LA
KY
IA
IN

gene
ra

no-m
entio
n

perm
it

WA
SC
ID
AZ
AL

WY
VA
TN
RI
ND
NY
NM
NJ
NV
NE
MT
MS
MN
MA
ME
KS
IL
HI
GA
DC
DE
CT
CO
CA
AR
AK

Figure 9 - Distribution of States’ Scores for Age Orientation, by Line of Insurance
We predicted relatively few specific statutes would regulate property/casualty insurance
with respect to age, only because of the seeming irrelevance of age. In fact, there were more
than a few (twenty) that had some type of specific age-related restriction property/casualty
insurers, six of which were outright prohibitions. What this suggests, of course, is that we may
have been wrong about the risks of property/casualty insurance—especially homeowners’
insurance—having no correlation with age. Indeed, when we subsequently looked into what
kinds of questions insurers actually ask applicants for homeowners’ insurance (as revealed in
their rate filings, in which they seek approval from regulators to take various characteristics into
account in their underwriting), age was specifically listed. Some insurers even give senior
discounts. So apparently age correlates more with homeowners’ risk, and thus with
property/casualty risk, than we had thought.

5. Credit score and zip code
We predicted regulation of credit score and zip would on average be more restrictive than
for age, but less than for the big three, and that prediction was borne out. Figure 5.(As was
mentioned before the differences in general are statistically significant at the 1% level). We
predicted variation across states, with some states limiting (though probably not prohibiting) and
others either not mentioning or expressly permitting the use of credit score and zip code. The
data are largely consistent with those predictions. For credit score in the property/casualty and
auto insurance context, the distribution of states looks somewhat bi-modal, with states clustering
either around some type of specific limitation, especially “strong limitation” (which is the modal
response), and others, a smaller number, clustering around “expressly permit.” For zip code,
there is less of a bi-modal split, but lots of variation. There are very few states that prohibit the
use of credit score or zip code in p/c and auto insurance. For health, life, and disability insurance,
there is a great deal of variation among the states about how they treat both zip code and credit
score, with no discernible pattern. And again, there are very few states with absolute
45
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prohibitions. Somewhat surprisingly, for health insurance, substantial numbers of jurisdictions
explicitly permit the use of zip codes; and the same can be said health, life, and disability
insurance and credit scores.
6. Genetics
Here again we predicted that the average level of regulation would be stricter than for
age, but less than for the big three, and that is consistent with Figure 5. For life insurance in
particular, we predicted that a substantial majority of states would either not regulate or
specifically permit the use of genetic testing, because of adverse selection concerns. There are
some states that have statutes specifically permitting the use of genetic testing by life insurers
(16), but not as many as we expected—perhaps because regulators assumed that the absence of
limitations or prohibitions would be sufficient to allow life insurers to use genetic testing when
necessary. There were also a few specific limitations (6), and only one prohibition on the use of
genetic testing by life insurers. The most common type of result was a general restriction on
unfair discrimination, which we code as a 1 on the strictness continuum. As with sexual
orientation that can reflect our coding system which allows general restriction laws (category
one) to capture characteristics that were not contemplated by states’ legislatures when they
enacted these laws. With respect to health insurance, we predicted that, consistent with the recent
federal law forbidding the use of genetic information, there would be similar laws at the state
level, and that proved accurate. All but one state prohibits the use of genetic testing in health
insurance. That result is even more uniform than we expected. For disability insurance, we
predicted more variation than with health insurance, because of the greater moral hazard concern
than there is with health insurance. 143 The result in fact shows variation, although there more
states (20) expressly permitting the use of gender in disability insurance than we expected.
Perhaps the moral hazard concern was larger than we imagined.
IV. Conclusion and Reflections
Anti-discrimination rules are a pervasive and fundamental feature of the American legal
regime. Thousands of academic articles and judicial opinions have thus wrestled with the rules
that govern permissible and impermissible discrimination in domains ranging from employment
law to constitutional law to housing law. And yet, in the insurance domain – where
discrimination is openly practiced and central to insurers’ business models and economic
functions – the precise rules that govern the line between permissible and impermissible
discrimination has been almost entirely ignored, in large part because of the complexity and
opacity of state law on the topic. This Article remedies this tremendous gap in the literature by
systematically describing state insurance anti-discrimination law.

143

Moral hazard is a big problem for disability coverage, since a nontrivial number of people prefer, when
possible, not to work and still get paid.
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Our findings reveal various discrepancies between the reality of state insurance antidiscrimination law and the largely theoretical literature on the topic. The most surprising, and
potentially troubling, is that such laws often have little to say about the most important and
divisive types of discrimination: distinctions based on race, national origin, or religion. This
finding is normatively troubling on multiple fronts even if, as we suspect, virtually no carriers
are explicitly taking into account these factors in their underwriting. This is because most forms
of discrimination in these domains operate in subtle and often unconscious ways that may
manifest themselves, for instance, in assumptions about risk in particular neighborhoods or for
particular products. Even when actuarial support can be found for these assumptions, that does
not mean that they are not intimately tied up with socially suspect characteristics. And, even in
the absence of any impermissible motive, important and almost entirely unexamined questions
remain about the extent to which insurers’ use of particular characteristics that have disparate
impacts on certain groups raise legal concerns.
Whatever the answers are to these difficult questions, the stunted development of state
insurance law and regulation on the topic seems to suggest a deeper problem. In particular, it
suggests that state law and regulation has largely ignored difficult and fundamental questions
about how we allow insurers to discriminate – and thus spread risk across social boundaries that
impact discrete minority groups. Indeed, this view is substantially confirmed by the insurance
industry’s outcry over recent federal regulations making clear that disparate impact analysis
under the Fair Housing Act extends to the provision of the insurance that is required for
housing. 144 It is also confirmed by the variability in state laws on zip code and credit score, two
characteristics that have been specifically alleged to operate as proxies for suspect policyholder
characteristics.
The states’ lack of attention to these issues, combined with the recent federal rules on the
FHA’s applicability to insurance, suggests that it may be time for the federal government to play
a larger role in regulating insurance discrimination impacting race, national origin, and religion.
Indeed, federal law already pervasively regulates against discrimination on these bases, in both
the constitution and in numerous federal statutes. 145 To be sure, this fact is in tension with
traditional primacy of states in regulating insurance markets – an approach endorsed in the
McCarran Ferguson Act. But that allocation of powers is not absolute, and is premised on the
assumption that states are well-situated to regulate insurance markets effectively and, with the
help of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, consistently. Our results raise
substantial questions along both domains.
144

See HUD Rule Imposes Disparate Impact Standard on Insurance, Insurance Compliance Insight.
E.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-and following (prohibiting employers from
discriminating against applicants and employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin,
including membership in a Native American tribe); The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.
621-634 (prohibiting discrimination against 40-and-over employees based on age); and the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213 (prohibiting employers from discriminating against people with disabilities
in any aspect of employment).
145

47
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013

47

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 52 [2013]

Nor are the normative implications of this Article’s findings limited to the “big three.”
For instance, this Article’s findings expose a broad pattern of inconsistent and conflicting state
laws on insurance anti-discrimination when it comes to gender. Across numerous lines of
coverage – including life automobile and health – state law and regulation is highly variable and
inconsistent, despite the centrality of the prominence of these issues in public policy circles for
decades. Whatever our views are of the quality of state-level insurance regulation, it seems odd
that the laws governing the circumstances in which a person may be discriminated against on the
basis of their gender would be anything other than a national norm. People in Delaware should
care about, and have a policy interest in, discrimination in New Mexico, and vice versa. In
health insurance, at least, the Affordable Care Act preempted state law to articulate a principle
that women should not be discriminated against even though they do indeed have higher medical
costs, at least within certain age ranges. Perhaps a similar approach is warranted in other lines of
coverage.
In addition to these normative implications, the Article also has the potential to reveal
which theoretical arguments on risk classification in insurance have traction in state
policymaking. For instance, one persistent finding is that life insurance is less regulated than
other lines of insurance. This finding was consistent with our predictions, because life insurance
seems more susceptible to adverse selection than other lines of insurance. But more analysis is
needed to determine whether this suggests, as we initially predicted, that state lawmakers and
regulators are responsive to the risk of regulatory adverse selection due to the lobbying power
and influence of the industry. Similarly, consistent with our predictions, age is less regulated
than other policyholder characteristics. But whether this reveals more about the fairness of
discrimination on the basis of mutable characteristics like age, or the adverse selection risk of
regulatory risk classification restrictions on that basis, requires further interrogation and analysis.
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Figure - Distribution of States’ Scores for Credit Score, by Line of Insurance
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